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INTRODUCTION 
Online activities no longer represent a new or emerging aspect of 
the collegiate experience.1  College students are “wired.”2  They are 
actively engaged with social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, 
and Twitter; they participate regularly in online gaming activities;  
and they own devices like smart phones and tablets that facilitate 
their online participation.  According to a Pew Research Center 
study, the eighteen to twenty-four age group is highly wired, report-
ing over 80% of four-year undergraduates and graduate students as 
having social networking sites.3  Indeed, virtual spaces now constitute 
an integral and common aspect of the daily lives of many college stu-
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 1 Compare Steve Jones, The Internet Goes to College:  How Students Are Living in the Future with 
Today’s Technology, PEW INTERNET, 2–4 (Sept. 15, 2002), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2002/PIP_College_Report.pdf.p
df (concluding that college students are early adopters of the Internet, the Internet en-
hances their education, and their social lives have been changed by the Internet), with 
Aaron Smith et al., College Students and Technology, PEW INTERNET (July 19, 2011), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/College-students-and-
technology/Report.aspx (discussing the use of the Internet among college students). 
 2 ANA M. MARTINEZ ALEMAN & KATHERINE LYNK WARTMAN, ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING 
ON CAMPUS:  UNDERSTANDING WHAT MATTERS IN STUDENT CULTURE 43–88 (2009); Tiffa-
ny A. Pempek et al., College Students’ Social Networking Experiences on Facebook, 30 J. APPLIED 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 227, 227–38 (2009) (analyzing the use of online social net-
works by college students). 
 3 Aaron Smith et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
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dents.4  Along with personal online activity not directly connected to 
their academic endeavors, students’ participation in online environ-
ments extends increasingly to formal instructional contexts, with 
many courses now taught wholly or partially online.5  A study commis-
sioned by the U.S. Department of Education reported significant in-
creases in online education.6  During the 1999–2000 academic year, 
only 8% of undergraduate students enrolled in at least one online 
course.7  By the 2007–2008 academic year, that percentage rose to 
20%.8  Suffice it to say, virtual spaces reflect a dimensional compo-
nent of higher education.  Further, college professors use Internet-
based capacities, such as social media, to enhance on-campus instruc-
tion.9 
Even as student speech and expression have become increasingly 
characterized by an online dimension, colleges and the courts are 
struggling to “catch up” in terms of the legally permissible limits over 
student online speech and expression, both in and out of formal cur-
ricular settings.10  For colleges, the reverberating quality of online 
speech can preserve and magnify harmful and negative attention re-
 
 4 Throughout this Article, we use the term “college” to refer to advanced postsecondary 
education, and it applies to both college and university. 
 5 Jered Borup et al., The Influence of Asynchronous Video Communication on Learner Social Pres-
ence:  A Narrative Analysis of Four Cases, 34 DISTANCE EDUC. 48 (2013) (assessing the impact 
of asynchronous video communication on the learning of different types of students); 
Alendra Lyons et al., Video Lecture Format, Student Technological Efficacy, and Social Presence in 
Online Courses, 28 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 181 (2012) (assessing the effect of adding 
social presence cues to online video lectures); Leyla Zhuhadar et al., The Impact of Social 
Multimedia Systems on Cyberlearners, 29 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 378 (2013) (applying 
social learning analytics to assess the impact of Social Media Systems on college students 
taking online courses). 
 6 ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., LEARNING AT A DISTANCE:  
UNDERGRADUATE ENROLLMENT IN DISTANCE EDUCATION COURSES AND DEGREE PROGRAMS 
4 (2011).  In postsecondary education practice, the term “distance education” may in-
clude programs delivered in-person but off-site from the main campus.  Here, the report 
specifically excludes that type of delivery, and it defines “distance education” as “deliv-
ered using live, interactive audio or videoconferencing, pre-recorded instructional videos, 
webcasts, CD-ROM or DVD, or computer-based systems delivered over the Internet.”  Id. 
at 2. 
 7 Id. at 6. 
 8 Id. 
 9 MIKE MORAN ET AL., TEACHING, LEARNING, AND SHARING:  HOW TODAY’S HIGHER 
EDUCATION FACULTY USE SOCIAL MEDIA 11–14 (2011), available at 
http://www.babson.edu/Academics/Documents/babson-survey-research-group/ teach-
ing-learning-and-sharing.pdf. 
 10 Issues with student online speech are certainly not confined to the higher education 
realm.  Especially at the secondary level, schools and courts have struggled over the ap-
propriate legal standards that should apply to student online speech. 
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sulting from online activities.11  For instance, an image posted on In-
stagram can be passed along, re-imaged, and archived as to continue 
the expression beyond what the original messenger may have initially 
intended.  Further, these social media exchanges may attract atten-
tion from individuals outside of campus, the media, and other inter-
ested parties.12  The technology has presented challenges for the 
courts as well.  A legal stumbling block encountered in online speech 
cases, taking place in higher education contexts, involves the judici-
ary’s previous overreliance on legal standards largely derived from 
the elementary and secondary education setting in determining col-
lege students’ speech rights.  Several higher education online speech 
cases reveal legal inconsistency and disagreement on the part of 
courts in terms of which legal framework to use.13 
In this Article, we explore the challenges facing colleges and the 
courts regarding student online speech and other expressive conduct 
that emerge within collegiate learning spaces, such as in courses or 
student practicums and internships.  Our analysis leads us to propose 
a refined framework, which we call the “Curricular Nexus Test,” to 
address this inconsistently analyzed area of law.14  The proposed 
 
 11 Jack Stripling, Panelists Debate How Far Colleges Should Go to Monitor Online Behavior, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 7, 2011, http://chronicle.com/article/Panelists-Debate-How-
Far/126298. 
 12 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION:  GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET 71 (2007); Kashmir Hill, Dear College Students, Please Stop Taking Photos of 
Your Inappropriately-Themed Frat Parties, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/02/06/dear-college-students-please-stop-
taking-photos-when-you-hold-inappropriately-themed-frat-parties/. 
 13 See, e.g., Feine v. Parkland Coll. Bd. of Trs., No. 09-2246, 2010 WL 1524201, at *11 (C.D. 
Ill. Feb. 25, 2010) (holding that a professor did not violate his student’s free speech rights 
by disciplining him for posts made to a class message board); Harrell v. S. Or. Univ., No. 
08-3037-CL, 2009 WL 3562732 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009), aff’d, 381 F. App’x 731 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that the university did not violate a student’s free speech rights for com-
ments made on an online class message board); Murakowski v. Univ. of Del., 575 F. Supp. 
2d 571, 592 (D. Del. 2008) (holding that the university violated a student’s First Amend-
ment rights when it disciplined him for postings he made to a Web site hosted by the 
University). 
 14 This test is distinguishable from the test put forth in arguments that accept Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), but do not fully contextualize and define 
the properties and dimensions of such acceptance.  See, e.g., Jessica Golby, Note, The Case 
Against Extending Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier’s Public Forum Analysis to the Regulation of Univer-
sity Student Speech, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1263, 1282–85 (2006) (presenting a simplified fo-
rum analysis based on distinguishing extracurricular and curricular speech, thus preserv-
ing the Hazelwood standard in a seemingly more defined and limited context).  At the 
same time, our test is largely consistent with concerns about the fit between K–12 speech 
and higher education speech cases.  See Edward L. Carter et al., Applying Hazelwood to 
College Speech:  Forum Doctrine and Government Speech in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 157, 160 (2006) (concluding that, based on an analysis of appellate cases using 
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framework applies to cases within one area of college students’ online 
speech controversies that have been marked by particular legal con-
fusion, namely, when students engage in independent speech (as op-
posed to school-sponsored speech) pertaining or connected to a colle-
giate learning space.15  That is, we focus on instances when college 
officials may regulate and restrict students’ independent online 
speech on academic grounds.  To that end, the Article addresses in-
dependent student speech arising from, or in direct relation to, for-
mal instructional contexts as well as speech occurring outside of a 
class setting, but still connected with the collegiate learning space.  
For speech taking place in a formal instructional context, while be-
lieving that colleges need sufficient leeway to regulate the class envi-
ronment, we contend that colleges should be required to demon-
strate a legitimate curricular or pedagogical justification to restrict 
independent student speech.  While acknowledging that standards 
articulated in previous cases, especially Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, are certainly not without application in regards to college 
students’ independent in-class speech, we argue that courts should be 
more careful in defining what constitutes a legitimate curricular or 
pedagogical justification in a college setting versus overreliance on 
logic more appropriate for elementary and secondary education con-
texts.  With speech occurring outside of an instructional setting, we 
argue that a sufficient curricular nexus should exist in such instances 
to subject student speech to institutional authority on academic 
grounds. 
To situate our discussion in a broader legal context, Part I of the 
Article presents three factors that have shaped the way student free 
speech cases have been analyzed.  These factors introduce leading le-
gal cases and principles concerning free speech and expression that 
are generally associated with student speech rights in higher educa-
tion.  The Part also explores problems resulting from courts failing to 
differentiate student speech in higher education from that in ele-
mentary or secondary education contexts.  In Part II, the Article ex-
amines legal decisions specifically dealing with online speech to iden-
tify the frameworks that have been applied.  Building on our 
examination of these cases, we propose, in Part III, standards that 
 
Hazelwood in the college student speech context, principles from K–12 education cases do 
not fit higher education cases).  However, this Article builds on prior criticisms and re-
sponds to them with a functional approach. 
 15 While our Article focuses on college students’ independent online speech, the legal prin-
ciples and standards we advocate are not confined solely to online speech in many in-
stances. 
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provide legal clarification regarding when institutions may restrain or 
restrict college students’ independent online speech on academic 
grounds, both in and out of class.  Finally, in Part IV, the Article 
summarizes problems created by failing to distinguish between rights 
in higher education and elementary or secondary school.  It also re-
caps the legal standards that we propose to help remedy the practical 
problem colleges and courts face in understanding institutional au-
thority to regulate student speech for academically based reasons. 
I.  FACTORS SHAPING COLLEGE STUDENTS’ SPEECH RIGHTS WITHIN THE 
COLLEGIATE LEARNING SPACE 
This Part traces the contours and discusses problems that have 
arisen in relation to legal standards commonly applied by courts to 
college students’ independent speech in what we have termed the 
“collegiate learning space.”  Three major factors are considered.  
First, Subpart A examines over-reliance by courts on the K–12 student 
speech cases to construct First Amendment policies that extend to 
higher education students.  While college students should enjoy 
greater degrees of freedom based on age, maturity, and educational 
purpose, these cases make few distinctions between the K–12 and 
higher education case analyses.  Second, Subpart B presents a limit-
ing frame in which these college student speech cases often operate.  
Specifically, these cases have used physical location to construct what 
falls within the curricular learning space, and such a line of demarca-
tion presents problems for online student speech.  Third, Subpart C 
illustrates how the differences in factual scenarios in which colleges 
and K–12 institutions try to regulate speech regarding curricular mat-
ters are not limited to physical location.  Taking these three Subparts 
together, the problems with analyzing college students’ speech rights 
within the collegiate learning space, especially online speech, begin 
to unfold. 
A.  Courts’ Over-reliance on K–12 Student Speech Cases 
A complicating factor in untangling the tension between college 
students’ independent speech rights and institutional authority over 
academic matters rests with the available legal frameworks and analyt-
ic approaches.  Courts have drawn significantly on K–12 student 
speech cases as the bases for the framework for and analytic approach 
to college student speech cases.16  In particular, two Supreme Court 
 
 16 See discussion infra Parts II.B and III.B. 
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cases dealing with secondary students, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District17 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,18 
have played significant roles in shaping the legal framework for how 
many courts handle public college students’ speech claims. 
In Tinker, one of the foundational student speech cases, the Su-
preme Court denied the authority of high school officials to prohibit 
a group of students from wearing armbands as a form of silent protest 
of American military involvement in Vietnam.19  The Court stated that 
school officials cannot restrict student speech unless it substantially 
interferes with the educational environment or impairs the rights of 
other students.20  The students’ expressions, via the armbands, nei-
ther substantially interfered with the educational environment nor 
impaired the rights of other students.21  An important aspect of Tinker 
involves reliance by courts on the decision to evaluate student speech 
as coming independently from students, rather than deemed as 
school-sponsored or taking place in connection with some type of 
formal instructional undertaking.22 
While Tinker presented an issue of students’ independent speech, 
a subsequent case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, brought for-
ward a challenge involving an instructional environment in the con-
text of a journalism class to introduce a framework for school-
sponsored speech.23  In Hazelwood, the Court upheld a principal’s au-
thority to censor articles appearing in a student newspaper, produced 
as part of a journalism course.24  According to the Court, the Tinker 
standards proved inapplicable to the student speech at issue in Hazel-
wood because the case dealt with speech arising from curricular mat-
ters rather than speech sprouting independently from students and 
not involving an instructional dimension.25  The Court deemed this 
 
 17 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 18 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 19 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–10. 
 20 Id. at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment, are available to teachers and students.  It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
 21 Id. at 509. 
 22 See discussion infra Parts II.B and III.B. 
 23 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262–63. 
 24 Id. at 262–63, 266. 
 25 Id. at 270–271.  The Hazelwood School Board Policy indicated that “[s]chool sponsored 
publications are developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implica-
tions in regular classroom activities.”  Id. at 268.  This policy supported the Court’s analy-
sis that the school newspaper fell within a curricular space grounded in educational pur-
poses and not a public forum.  Id. at 268–69. 
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speech to be school-sponsored speech tied to the curriculum26 and, 
setting a new framework, it held that school officials possessed great-
er authority over such school-sponsored speech.27  In such instances, 
held the Court, school officials can limit student expression when 
such a restriction is reasonable—that is, when the school acts with a 
legitimate pedagogical purpose.28  While the policy argument for this 
framework is grounded largely in response to the custodial responsi-
bilities of educators in elementary and secondary schools,29 importa-
tion of the Hazelwood standards to adults in the higher education set-
ting has generated criticism from legal commentators30 and several 
 
 26 Id. at 272–73. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 273. 
 29 See id. at 271 (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form of 
student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is de-
signed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inap-
propriate for their level of maturity.”).  School administrators may weigh other factors in 
decision-making.  For instance,  
a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended 
audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially 
sensitive topics, which might range from the existence of Santa Claus in an ele-
mentary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school 
setting. 
  Id. at 272.  The Court perceived education as a social institution that is responsible for a 
child’s development, stating that “the schools would be unduly constrained from fulfilling 
their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his envi-
ronment,’” if they were not allowed to discipline such speech.  Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 30 See, e.g., Richard M. Goehler, Hosty Is a “Recipe for Confusion and Conflict,” 23 COMM. LAW. 
21, 24 (2005) (criticizing a Seventh Circuit opinion applying Hazelwood to college stu-
dents’ speech); Gregory C. Lisby, Resolving the Hazelwood Conundrum:  The First Amend-
ment Rights of College Students in Kincaid v. Gibson and Beyond, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 129, 156 
(2002) (predicting “dire consequences” if Hazelwood is applied to college students’ 
speech); Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”:  The Case Against Ex-
tending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1948, 1950–51, 1965 
(2002) (arguing that applying Hazelwood to college students’ speech would reject prece-
dent, close the distinction between college students and secondary school students, and 
could curb the tenor of colleges as a “marketplace of ideas”); Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, 
Demoted to High School:  Are College Students’ Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High School 
Students?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 173, 199 (2003) (arguing that Hazelwood should not be applied 
to college students and asserting the use of Tinker’s material and substantial disruption 
test); Chris Sanders, Note, Censorship 101:  Anti-Hazelwood Laws and the Preservation of Free 
Speech at Colleges and Universities, 58 ALA. L. REV. 159, 160 (2006) (advocating for anti-
Hazelwood statutes to protect student free expression in colleges, particularly student pub-
lications).  But see Christopher N. LaVigne, Note, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier and the Univer-
sity:  Why the High School Standard Is Here to Stay, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1191, 1197 (2008) 
(suggesting that federal courts will continue to apply Hazelwood to college students’ 
speech). 
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legal opinions.31  Despite these critiques, courts routinely look to the 
decision in cases involving college students.32 
B.  Importance of Physical Location 
In many instances, First Amendment speech protections available 
to public college students33 turn upon the context in which the 
 
 31 See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 248 (3d Cir. 2010) (indicating dis-
tinctions between speech rights of K–12 students and college students as the basis for not 
using the K–12 cases as firm rules in deciding college student speech cases); Kincaid v. 
Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (indicating that the Hazelwood 
framework was inappropriate for analyzing the rights of college students to express con-
tent in a yearbook); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 518 (Minn. 2012) (conclud-
ing that the Hazelwood framework is an inappropriate standard for analyzing whether a 
student’s Facebook posts are entitled to First Amendment protection from a university’s 
disciplinary sanctions). 
 32 See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1826 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying Hazel-
wood to a play performed by college students); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 
(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that restrictions on a college professor’s religious references in 
class were permissible).  Notably, one case that has generated a significant amount of crit-
icism is the decision of Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc).  
In Hosty II, students on the staff of the state university newspaper printed unflattering 
comments about an administrator.  Id. at 732–33.  When challenged about the accuracy 
of certain statements, the student journalist declined to retract any information or print 
the administration’s response to the matter.  Id. at 733.  Soon after, another administrator 
required that all subsequent papers be cleared by the administration prior to printing.  
Id.  The students alleged that the administrators halted the newspaper printing, required 
prior approval for future publications, and threatened to suspend the newspaper’s alloca-
tion.  Hosty v. Governors State Univ., 174 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2001).  Among 
the claims, the students challenged the university under First Amendment speech rights.  
Id.  The trial court granted summary judgment to all the defendants except for one, the 
dean who halted production and required prior approval before printing.  Hosty II, 412 
F.3d at 733.  On interlocutory appeal, the federal appellate court made clear that Hazel-
wood was the wrong framework.  Hosty v. Carter (Hosty I), 325 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 
2003).  Circuit Judge Terence T. Evans explained that “Hazelwood’s rationale for limiting 
the First Amendment rights of high school journalism students is not a good fit for stu-
dents at colleges or universities.”  Id. at 948.  He clarified that “[t]he differences between 
a college and a high school are far greater than the obvious differences in curriculum 
and extracurricular activities.  The missions of each are distinct reflecting the unique 
needs of students of differing ages and maturity levels.”  Id.  The Dean filed a petition for 
rehearing en banc, and the petition was granted.  Hosty II, 412 F.3d at 733.  In a 7-4 deci-
sion, the majority decided that Hazelwood was the appropriate framework.  Id. at 734.  In 
dicta, the court posed a discussion that weakened the curricular versus extracurricular 
distinction, pointing out times when a university may have a publication involving extra-
curricular activities of students but nonetheless fall outside the public forum sphere.  Id. 
at 734–35. 
 33 At both public and private colleges, standards derived from contract represent a source of 
standards relevant to charting students’ First Amendment rights.  While courts are often 
resistant to depict the student/college relationship as simply contractual in nature, con-
tract standards are routinely looked to in determining the legal rights of students.  See, 
e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 304 n.1 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that one of the 
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speech takes place.34  Courts typically afford public colleges greater 
legal leeway in placing limits on student speech occurring in formal 
instructional contexts, such as the classroom.  In contrast, institution-
al authority often diminishes in relation to student speech taking 
 
initial claims asserted in a student’s challenge of the sexual harassment policy included a 
state contract claim); Mangla v. Brown Univ., 135 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (recognizing 
student handbooks as terms of the contract between the college and student); Goodman 
v. President & Trs. of Bowdoin Coll., 135 F. Supp. 2d 40, 55–56 (D. Me. 2001) (offering a 
discussion about various courts’ recognition of contractual relationships as a legal source 
for students to pursue).  Under these standards, institutions must abide by the rules and 
standards that have been established to guide student conduct.  Such standards are po-
tentially of special relevance at private institutions, where they establish the speech pro-
tections available for students.  Along with contractual standards, some state courts have 
also imposed a common law duty on private colleges to not treat students in a capricious 
or arbitrary manner and provided protections analogous to due process protections avail-
able to public higher education students.  See, e.g., Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. 
Supp. 2d 697, 710 (D. Vt. 2012) (stating that under Vermont law, a private college’s 
breach of contract with a student as derived from the terms in the student handbook re-
quires a showing that the “disciplinary action at issue is fundamentally unfair, arbitrary, or 
capricious” (internal citation omitted)).  At least one state, California, has enacted a law 
requiring secular private colleges to provide students with the same First Amendment 
rights that are available at public institutions.  Yu v. Univ. of La Verne, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
763, 770–72 (Ct. App. 2011) (discussing California’s Leonard Law, which prohibits pri-
vate colleges and universities from disciplining students for off-campus speech when that 
speech would otherwise be protected under the First Amendment or the state constitu-
tion). 
 34 While the Hazelwood decision discussed the school’s sponsorship of the newspaper, the 
Court emphasized the locus of the speech, namely that the student newspaper was creat-
ed and edited by students enrolled in a journalism class.  484 U.S. at 271 (“[S]chool-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that stu-
dents, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the impri-
matur of the school . . . may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, 
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are super-
vised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student 
participants and audiences.”).  See also Head v. Bd. of  Trs. of the Cal. State Univ., 315 F. 
App’x 7, 8 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that a state university student failed to state a 
First Amendment violation based on the university’s program that required students to 
take a “multicultural” course, which he claimed was counter to his conservative posi-
tions); Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285–86 (holding that state university faculty may require 
a student to perform a play that includes words the student feels uncomfortable saying as 
the program presented justifications that were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a state univer-
sity student did not have a First Amendment right to submit a nonconforming thesis or to 
have a hearing regarding the disapproval of the nonconforming thesis); Salehpour v. 
Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 208 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that a state university student 
had no protectable protest rights when he failed to comply with the rule barring first-year 
dental students from sitting in the last row of the classroom and that college administra-
tors had the authority to discipline him for the violation); O’Neal v. Falcon, 668 F. Supp. 
2d 979, 986–87 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (determining that barring a public college student from 
presenting on a controversial topic, which might interfere with students’ ability to focus 
on speech mechanics rather than the subject matter, presents a legitimate pedagogical 
concern). 
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place outside of formal instructional situations.35  Apart from special 
circumstances, such as speech of a threatening or harassing nature, 
student speech, if it occurs outside of a curricular context, generally 
receives substantially more constitutional protection than if it occurs 
in an instructional setting.36  This distinction proved more easily dis-
cernible in a pre-Internet age, as courts could often rely on physical 
location (e.g., student speech taking place in a classroom) in helping 
to distinguish between instructional and non-instructional settings in 
evaluating student speech claims.37  Indeed, this application of “loca-
tion” is consistent with Hazelwood, in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
integrated a forum analysis to determine that the classroom setting 
did not fall within a public forum.38  Similarly, other First Amend-
ment cases, outside of the online speech context, have determined 
that the educational place presents an analytical element.39 
As shown in several decisions involving online speech, physical lo-
cation breaks down as a proxy or determinative factor to categorize 
independent speech as taking place in an instructional or a non-
instructional context.40  As the Court emphasized in Tinker, “First 
 
 35 See, e.g., Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 688 (7th Cir. 2004) (striking down a state university 
chancellor’s preclearance policy that banned students and university employees from 
contacting prospective student athletes on grounds of infringement of free speech); 
Khademi v. S. Orange Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1023, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (striking down a public college’s student free speech policy on invalid prior re-
straint and overbreadth grounds).  Cf. Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 681 (8th Cir. 
1997) (finding that professors and students’ photographic display communicating a polit-
ical and historical message, located in the public corridor next to the state university’s 
classrooms, was protected speech). 
 36 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Unpleasant Speech on Campus, Even Hate Speech, Is a First Amendment 
Issue, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 770 (2009) (arguing that a university’s prohibition 
of the expression of hate would constitute a content-based restriction that violated the 
First Amendment). 
 37 Professor Zick suggests a new approach to examine “place” within speech cases, and he 
considers cyber-speech, but suggests that it might fall within an existing speech topogra-
phy he identifies.  See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech:  The Expressive Topography, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 439, 481–84 (2006) [hereinafter Zick, Space, Place, and Speech]; Timo-
thy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 619 n.252 (2006). 
 38 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267–70. 
 39 See, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that the differences 
between high school and university students presents an important analytical distinction); 
Smith v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613–14 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (finding 
that a college administration could not prevent students from wearing empty holsters in 
classrooms as a form of protest, even if they allowed them to do so in designated “free 
speech zones”). 
 40 See, e.g., Feine v. Parkland Coll. Bd. of Trs., No. 09-2246, 2010 WL 1524201, at *6 (C.D. Ill. 
Feb. 25, 2010) (finding that mean-spirited expressions attacking classmates through a 
public community college’s online course did not rise to the level of protected speech); 
Harrell v. S. Or. Univ., No. 08-3037-CL, 2009 WL 3562732, at *2 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009), 
aff’d, 381 F. App’x 731 (9th Cir. 2010) (supporting state university’s actions regulating 
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Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students” and 
they do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”41  But, the emergence of online 
environments has created difficulty for courts in defining where the 
schoolhouse gate should begin and end in relation to students’ 
online expression.  Nonetheless, courts have routinely relied on phys-
ical location in efforts to define students’ speech rights. 
C.  Faculty Authority over Curricular Matters 
While often playing a lesser and poorly articulated role in relation 
to the Hazelwood standards, faculty authority to regulate independent 
student speech taking place in an instructional setting or occurring 
out of class, but involving a curricular dimension, has been bolstered 
by Supreme Court decisions dealing with judicial deference to genu-
ine academic decisions.42  In Board of Curators of the University of Mis-
souri v. Horowitz, the Supreme Court stated that the types of due pro-
cess requirements often necessary in student disciplinary matters, 
such as a formal hearing, are not the same as those required in the 
context of academic decision-making.43  Similarly, in Regents of the 
University of Michigan v. Ewing, the Court announced that the judiciary 
should “show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment” 
when reviewing a truly academic decision and intervene only when an 
institution shows a “substantial departure from accepted academic 
 
speech within an online classroom).  Cases involving school-aged students, particularly at 
the junior high and high school levels, also import the use of “location.”  The school law 
cases rely much more on Tinker for their legal reach of school authority.  See, e.g., D.J.M. v. 
Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that a high 
school student’s online discussions presented a true threat and were not protected 
speech); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
the school had the authority to discipline a student for cyberbullying).  But see Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[U]nder the circum-
stances, the First Amendment prohibits the school from reaching beyond the schoolyard 
to impose what might otherwise be appropriate discipline.”); J.S ex rel. Snyder v. Blue 
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930–31 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (granting greater 
rights to public school students for off-campus speech that enters campus discussions). 
 41 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 42 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (“When judges 
are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . they should show 
great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.”); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of 
Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978) (holding that the procedural requirements of an 
academic dismissal are not stringent); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 
(2003) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its ed-
ucational mission is one to which we will defer.”). 
 43 435 U.S. at 86. 
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norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible 
did not actually exercise professional judgment.”44 
Courts have looked to Ewing and Horowitz as secondary sources of 
authority along with the primary reliance often given to Hazelwood to 
bolster arguments for judicial deference to institutional authority to 
regulate higher education student speech with some type of curricu-
lar connection or implicating pedagogical concerns.45  For instance, a 
recent decision from the Eleventh Circuit, Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley,46 
illustrates how the application of Ewing and Horowitz can be relied on 
by courts as a justification bolstering institutional authority to regu-
late student speech with a curricular nexus.  In Keeton, the Eleventh 
Circuit agreed with the district court in denying a graduate student’s 
request for a preliminary injunction to prohibit her dismissal from a 
counselor education program.47  The student, Jennifer Keeton, was 
dismissed from the program after she refused to complete a remedia-
tion program as a condition of participation in the program’s clinical 
practicum.48  The faculty imposed the remediation plan requirement 
based on Keeton’s comments made in and out of class that demon-
strated her unwillingness to abide by relevant professionalism stand-
ards for the counselor education program in her future interactions 
with clients.49  In reviewing Keeton’s First Amendment speech and re-
ligion claims, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the Hazelwood standards 
and also relied on the principles articulated in Horowitz and Ewing re-
garding the need for courts to show deference to academic decision-
making.50  According to the court, forcing the university to let Keeton 
participate in the practicum course threatened to “interfere” with the 
program’s “control over its curriculum.”51  In looking to Hazelwood, 
however, the court was relying on legal standards for school-
sponsored speech when Keeton’s speech, even though implicating 
curricular concerns, was clearly independent student speech. 
As a case such as Keeton illustrates, neither the line of cases ad-
dressing student speech in public schools nor the line of cases ad-
 
 44 474 U.S. at 225. 
 45 See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 732 (6th Cir. 2012) (crafting the decision around a 
deferential standard to academic decision-making, though not specifically identifying 
Ewing and Horowitz by name); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 962 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining 
the deferential standard afforded to the academic environment). 
 46 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 47 Id. at 880. 
 48 Id. at 868–69. 
 49 Id. at 869–70. 
 50 Id. at 875–76. 
 51 Id. at 875. 
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dressing student due process rights in academic grievances have es-
tablished a clear framework for challenges emerging from independ-
ent student speech that potentially implicates legitimate curricular 
concerns.  As we develop in Part IV, several cases with online facets 
have especially served to highlight the limitations of this current ap-
proach to defining college students’ speech rights. 
II.  CONTINUUM OF HIGHER EDUCATION STUDENT SPEECH CASES 
As discussed in the previous Part, while often failing to articulate 
speech standards specific and appropriate to higher education stu-
dents, courts have looked to Tinker and Hazelwood and, secondarily, to 
Horowitz and Ewing in defining college students’ speech rights in rela-
tion to institutional authority based on academic or curricular con-
cerns.  Decisions have followed a basic fault line where institutional 
authority is typically at a maximum in formal instructional settings 
and often diminishes markedly in relation to independent student 
speech occurring outside of such contexts.52  While the in-class/out-
of-class distinction has failed to create a tidy legal boundary and has 
increasingly become frayed because of the proliferation of online 
speech,53 we loosely follow this general division in organizing our dis-
cussion of cases in this Part.  First, Subpart A provides an overview of 
higher education student speech cases taking place in non-
instructional contexts and not characterized as triggering curricular 
concerns.  Then, Subpart B examines decisions originating in instruc-
tional (i.e., class) settings or in some way implicating curricular con-
siderations. 
A.  Speech Outside of an Instructional Context 
Several Supreme Court cases involving public college student 
speech outside of a formal instructional setting have dealt with stu-
 
 52 As discussed later, speech that threatens individuals is, however, subject to more intensive 
institutional regulation. 
 53 See, e.g., Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:09-CV-00205, 2012 WL 1078819, at *6 (W.D. 
Ky. Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that a college student had no First Amendment right to blog 
about a live birth she witnessed as part of a course on child bearing); see also Yoder v. 
Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:09-CV-205-S, 2011 WL 5434279 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 2011) (finding 
that an online posting by a college student in state university’s nursing program was not 
protected speech when the student described details of the birthing process experienced 
from a clinical course); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 2012) (hold-
ing that state university sanctions on a student for posts to social networking site did not 
violate the student’s free speech rights when the postings violated professional program 
rules).  These cases are discussed infra Part III.B. 
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dents engaged in speech or expression in campus settings generally 
open to students or student groups.  These cases have crafted judicial 
standards expanding college students’ free speech rights following 
the Tinker standards and forum analysis. 
In the formative case of Healy v. James,54 the Supreme Court, apply-
ing the principles articulated in Tinker, declared that First Amend-
ment protections apply to public college students’ speech.55  The 
Court rejected arguments that a group of students suffered no First 
Amendment deprivation when they were denied access to use campus 
facilities in the same way as other students because they could still 
meet off campus.56  According to the opinion, while the university 
could require students to adhere to “reasonable campus rules” to en-
sure that speech activities did not interfere with the educational op-
portunities of other students, it could not seek to silence students on 
the basis of expressing views disfavored by institutional officials.57 
Just a year later, the Court addressed another set of expressive ac-
tivities that university officials disfavored.  The case, Papish v. Board of 
Curators of the University of Missouri, also relied on the Tinker analysis.58  
In that case, a state university expelled a graduate student, calling in-
to question the decency of a political cartoon and choice of words, 
when she titled an article “M——f——” (i.e., Motherfucker), which 
was part of an organization’s name involved in the news story.59  Upon 
finding that the expressions were not obscene,60 the Court concluded 
that the university disapproved of the content as the basis for the stu-
dent’s expulsion.61  Thus, the university violated the student’s consti-
tutional rights when it failed to justify its actions based on reasonable 
rules governing conduct in a nondiscriminatory manner, but instead 
discriminated based on the speech content.62 
 
 54 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 55 Id. at 180–81, 189–91. 
 56 Id. at 183. 
 57 Id. at 189. 
 58 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam). 
 59 Id. at 667–68. 
 60 Id. at 670 (“We think Healy makes it clear that the mere dissemination of ideas—no mat-
ter how offensive to good taste—on a state university campus may not be shut off in the 
name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’ . . . [I]t is equally clear that neither the political 
cartoon nor the headline story involved in this case can be labeled as constitutionally ob-
scene or otherwise unprotected.”). 
 61 Id. (“[T]he facts set forth in the opinions below show clearly that petitioner was expelled 
because of the disapproved content of the newspaper rather than the time, place, or man-
ner of its distribution.”). 
 62 Id. at 671.  In one of the dissenting opinions, Justice Burger questioned the conclusion of 
the Court that the university could not exercise authority to expel Papish.  Id. at 672 
(Burger, J. dissenting) (“[I]t is not unreasonable or violative of the Constitution to sub-
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Starting in the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court faced a series of 
challenges that addressed the space of the expressive activity.  A 
landmark decision, Widmar v. Vincent,63 addressed the broad First 
Amendment protections generally available to students and student 
groups when a public institution creates some type of campus forum 
for independent student speech and expression.  In the decision, the 
Supreme Court held that a university that had made its facilities 
available to meetings for student groups could not then deny campus 
access to a student organization with a religious purpose absent a 
compelling governmental interest64 or as part of a reasonable, con-
tent-neutral regulation of the time, place, or manner in which the 
speech occurred.65  According to the Court, once the university opted 
to create a forum generally open for use by student organizations, it 
could not restrict access on content grounds absent a compelling 
governmental justification.66 
In Widmar, the Court stated that permitting student organizations 
to use university facilities resulted in “a forum generally open for use 
by student groups.  Having done so, the University has assumed an 
obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applica-
ble constitutional norms.”67  Citing Police Department v. Mosley68 and 
Healy, the Supreme Court discussed how it had “recognized that the 
campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many 
of the characteristics of a public forum.”69  But, the Court also stated 
that First Amendment standards should be evaluated “‘in light of the 
 
ject to disciplinary action those individuals who distribute publications which are at the 
same time obscene and infantile.  To preclude a state university or college from regulat-
ing the distribution of such obscene materials does not protect the values inherent in the 
First Amendment; rather, it demeans those values.”).  The university documented 
Papish’s academic probation and her provocative actions around campus.  Id. at 674–75 
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting).  While Papish may have been a controversial figure in terms of 
academic performance and campus discussions, the per curium opinion noted that the 
university’s decision still rested on the content of Papish’s speech.  Id. at 670–71 n.6 
(“[I]n the absence of any disruption of campus order or interference with the rights of 
others, the sole issue was whether a state university could proscribe this form of expres-
sion.”). 
 63 454 U.S. 263 (1981).  Much of the debate in Widmar centered on whether the university 
could deny access to the student organization as part of an effort to avoid a potential Es-
tablishment Clause violation.  Id. at 270. 
 64 Id. at 269–270.  The Court rejected the university’s arguments that it should be permitted 
to deny the student group access to avoid Establishment Clause concerns.  Id. at 273. 
 65 Id. at 276. 
 66 Id. at 267–68. 
 67 Id. 
 68 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 69 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 n.5. 
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special characteristics of the school environment.’”70  According to 
the Widmar opinion, 
A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as 
streets or parks or even municipal theaters.  A university’s mission is edu-
cation, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university’s au-
thority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission 
upon the use of its campus and facilities.  We have not held, for example, 
that a campus must make all of its facilities equally available to students 
and nonstudents alike, or that a university must grant free access to all of 
its grounds or buildings.71 
This excerpt suggests that public higher education reflects a substan-
tially different kind of government organization with greater latitude 
to impose speech restrictions. 
Later Supreme Court cases illuminated the standards applicable 
to student forums at public colleges.  In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi-
tors of the University of Virginia,72 Board of Regents of the University of Wis-
consin System v. Southworth,73 and, most recently, in Christian Legal Socie-
ty v. Martinez (CLS),74 the Court evaluated institutional policies 
providing access in terms of campus facilities, funding opportunities, 
and organizational membership for officially recognized student 
groups as limited public forums, with accompanying requirements of 
reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality. 
In short, the Healy and Papish cases present general institutional 
limits to restricting college student speech that is independent in na-
ture and outside of an instructional context, though it occurs within 
some type of physical or virtual campus forum.  These decisions and 
others establish that colleges may limit such speech based on reason-
able campus rules and without content-based restrictions.  Widmar, 
Rosenberger, Southworth, and CLS crafted constitutional standards based 
on the expressive space in which the speech takes place.  Notably, 
when a limited public forum has been established, a college may re-
strict speech based on reasonable regulations related to the purpose 
 
 70 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 71 Id. 
 72 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  Potentially instructive for student speech rights in online settings, in 
Rosenberger, the Court applied forum standards to a non-physical environment, as a stu-
dent religious organization sought access to funds available to help support student pub-
lications.  Id. at 826–27. 
 73 529 U.S. 217, 220–221 (2000) (holding that the state university’s viewpoint-neutral appli-
cation of student activities fees did violate students’ First Amendment rights). 
 74 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010) (finding that the state university’s nondiscrimination policy 
requiring all-comers to be eligible members of student groups did not violate free speech 
and expressive association rights of registered student organizations). 
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of the forum so long as the policy or action is viewpoint-neutral.75  In-
stitutional authority over student speech in campus forums designat-
ed for independent student speech is relatively circumscribed when 
compared to curricular-based student speech. 
B.  Student Speech Rights in Instructional Settings or Involving a Curricular 
Connection 
Unlike the relatively expansive First Amendment speech rights 
students often possess in non-instructional situations (absent particu-
lar conditions, such as speech that is threatening to specific individu-
als), courts have generally recognized heightened institutional au-
thority to regulate college student speech arising in class settings or 
somehow triggering curricular concerns, such as the enforcement of 
professionalism standards.76  The Hazelwood decision has proven espe-
cially important in framing the contours of college authority over 
student speech in instructional settings.77  As noted, U.S. Supreme 
Court cases establishing judicial deference for college and university 
decisions made on academic grounds have also served as a basis to 
permit enhanced institutional control over student speech in this ar-
ea of cases.78 
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson79 illustrates college authority in instructional 
settings and suggests, as well, some degree of judicial uncertainty re-
 
 75 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (holding that the university could not place content-based 
restrictions on speech in a limited public forum it had created).  A limited public forum 
is typically a nonpublic forum that the government has identified for purposes of certain 
groups or certain topics such as the student groups, facilities, or publications. 
 76 See, e.g., Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) (observing that schools are giv-
en flexibility in determining and enforcing course policies, but denying summary judg-
ment to the school on plaintiff’s claims that it had violated her First Amendment rights); 
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (deferring to the school’s 
curricular choices in analyzing a student’s First Amendment claims); see also, Neal H. 
Hutchens et al., Testing the Limits of Faculty Authority:  Graduate Students Challenge Profession-
alism Standards as Infringement of First Amendment Rights, 283 EDUC. L. REP. 637 (2012) (dis-
cussing Ward and Keeton); Neal H. Hutchens, A Delicate Balance:  Faculty Authority to Incorpo-
rate Professionalism Standards into the Curriculum Versus College and University Students’ First 
Amendment Rights, 270 EDUC. L. REP. 371 (2011) (discussing cases in which courts have as-
sessed First Amendment challenges to school professionalism standards). 
 77 See discussions supra Parts I.A and I.C.  The standards have also been applied to legal dis-
putes involving institutional authority to regulate professorial speech.  See, e.g., Bishop v. 
Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a college course was not a 
public forum). 
 78 In the context of legal deference to academic decisions, lower courts have also looked to 
Horowitz and Ewing in deciding student speech cases.  See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 
356 F.3d 1277, 1292 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d. 939, 950–51 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 79 356 F.3d at 1277. 
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garding an appropriate standard for student’s academic speech.  The 
case centered on a student enrolled in a theater program at the Uni-
versity of Utah.  The student argued that the First Amendment pro-
tected her from not having to express words she found offensive in 
fulfilling course assignments.80  In reviewing the student’s legal 
claims, the Tenth Circuit described the classroom as a “nonpublic fo-
rum” subject to reasonable regulations by officials on student 
speech.81  The opinion divided student speech in educational settings 
into the two areas of independent “student speech that ‘happens to 
occur on the school premises’”82 and “‘school-sponsored speech,’ 
which is “speech that a school ‘affirmatively . . . promotes’ as opposed 
to speech that it ‘tolerates,’” which is governed by Hazelwood.”83  While 
acknowledging disagreement among courts over applying Hazelwood 
to non-curricular student speech, the court stated that the standards 
from the decision applied to the current case because it dealt with 
curricular speech.84 
Brown v. Li, one of the cases relied on by the court in Axson-Flynn, 
highlights disagreement over the appropriate legal standards to gov-
ern independent student speech implicating some type of academic 
or curricular concern.85  This decision involved a graduate student 
who satisfied all degree requirements, but his committee withdrew its 
approval of his thesis after becoming aware that the student had in-
cluded a “Disacknowledgements” section in the document originally 
approved by the committee.86  In the “‘Disacknowledgements’” sec-
tion, the student stated that he “would like to offer special Fuck You’s 
to the following degenerates for . . . being an ever-present hindrance 
during my graduate career.”87  The student included elected officials, 
university employees, and academic departments among the targets 
of his comments.88  After being informed about the inclusion of the 
 
 80 Id. at 1280.  The student opted to withdraw from the university after the theater depart-
ment informed her that she would receive no exemption from being able to speak words 
that she found offensive in fulfilling course assignments.  Id. at 1282.  For support, the 
court looked to Settle v. Dickson County School Board, 53 F.3d 152, 155–56 (6th Cir. 1995), 
where the court relied on the Hazelwood framework to hold that a secondary school 
teacher, in the exercise of a legitimate pedagogical aim, could prohibit a student from 
writing an essay solely on Christianity or the life of Jesus. 
 81 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285. 
 82 Id. (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
 83 Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988)). 
 84 Id. at 1286 n.6. 
 85 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 86 Id. at 942. 
 87 Id. at 943. 
 88 Id. 
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material, the student’s thesis committee determined that the 
“Disacknowldegements” section failed to satisfy commonly accepted 
professional standards related to the inclusion of an acknowledg-
ments section in a thesis.89  The university eventually decided that it 
would award the student his degree based on the thesis originally ap-
proved without the offending section, but the student declined to 
submit the thesis without the “Disacknowledgements” page as the of-
ficial version to the university library.90 
A panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while 
agreeing to remand the case for consideration of a state constitution-
al claim, could not reach a consensus regarding the legal standards to 
guide analysis of the student’s First Amendment arguments.  The 
opinion announcing the court’s judgment asserted that the Hazelwood 
standards sufficed in providing the appropriate legal framework,91 
even though the authoring judge acknowledged that no Supreme 
Court decision had specifically addressed “the appropriate standard 
for reviewing a university’s regulation of students’ curricular speech” 
and it represented “an open question whether Hazelwood articulates 
the standard for reviewing a university’s assessment of a student’s ac-
ademic work.”92  Despite this lack of guidance from the Supreme 
Court, the judge stated that the Hazelwood standards still should apply 
to a higher education environment, with academic freedom consid-
erations supporting greater regulation of college students’ speech 
than would ostensibly be permissible for elementary and secondary 
students.93  According to the opinion, the committee acted in accord-
ance with a legitimate pedagogical purpose in refusing to approve the 
thesis.94 
One of the judges on the panel95 argued against applying the Ha-
zelwood standards to higher education students, stating that “the rea-
sons underlying the deference with respect to the regulation of the 
 
 89 Id. at 943. 
 90 Id. at 945.  Submitting the approved version to the library constituted a requirement for 
fulfilling degree requirements. 
 91 Id. at 949. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 951. The court acknowledged that faculty have academic freedom and autonomy to 
make decisions regarding teaching, but it found the Hazelwood case as the controlling 
framework to evaluate questions of curricular speech.  According to the court, the Hazel-
wood framework, unlike an academic freedom justification, “does not immunize the uni-
versity altogether from First Amendment challenges but, at the same time, appropriately 
defers to the university’s expertise in defining academic standards and teaching students 
to meet them.”  Id. at 952. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 957 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
68 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
speech rights of high school youths do not apply in the adult world of 
college and graduate students, an arena in which academic freedom 
and vigorous debate are supposed to flourish.”96  Instead, standards 
regulating the limited or designated public forum or associated with 
intermediate scrutiny represented better alternatives to evaluate re-
strictions on college students’ curricular-based speech.97  Accordingly, 
while agreeing with the decision to remand the case to examine the 
state constitutional issues, the judge rejected the Hazelwood frame-
work as the appropriate analysis for higher education contexts. 
Despite continued periodic questioning of reliance on Hazelwood 
to evaluate student speech claims in higher education, as demon-
strated by several lower federal court rulings, the decision continues 
to play a prominent role in higher education cases with a curricular 
dimension.98  In O’Neal v. Falcon,99 for instance, a community college 
student claimed that an instructor violated her First Amendment 
rights in refusing to let her select abortion as topic for an in-class 
speech assignment.100  The court, looking to Brown and Axson-Flynn, 
determined that the “Hazelwood framework” should guide its analy-
sis.101  The court refused to apply the Tinker standards because the 
student’s speech took place as part of a course assignment.102  The 
court stated that Hazelwood did not require it to balance the student’s 
speech rights against the college’s educational purpose in disallowing 
the speech; instead, the inquiry focused on whether a valid educa-
tional purpose motivated the institution’s actions.103  Additionally, the 
allowance of other controversial topics for discussion in class assign-
ments did not invalidate the school’s ability to prohibit the speech 
topic. 
 
 96 Id.  Another concurrence argued that the student’s act of deceit in hiding the 
“Disacknowledgements” section from the committee should bar the student from being 
able to assert a cognizable First Amendment claim.  Id. at 956 (Ferguson, J., concurring). 
 97 Id. at 963–64. 
 98 Courts have not limited the decision’s reach to cases involving students. In Bishop v. Aro-
nov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991), for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit looked to Hazelwood in rejecting a faculty member’s First Amendment 
arguments. 
 99 668 F. Supp. 2d 979 (W.D. Tex. 2009).  The school also obtained a temporary restraining 
order against the student for potentially threatening language communicated by the stu-
dent in legal documents related to the case.  Id. at 985 n.2. 
100 Id. at 982. 
101 Id. at 985. 
102 Id. at 987. 
103 Id. at 986 (citing Curry ex rel. Curry v. Hensiner, 513 F.3d 570, 579 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
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A federal district court case, Heenan v. Rhodes,104 which involved a 
nursing student, provides an instructive example of a court struggling 
with application of the Hazelwood standards to student speech failing 
to qualify as school-sponsored.  In Heenan, a student claimed that her 
dismissal from a nursing program occurred because she challenged 
the academic program’s disciplinary policy, which was based on a 
points system.105  In the case, the court issued an amended opinion to 
clarify several problematic legal stances it had seemingly taken in re-
gards to the legal standards appropriate to evaluate the student’s 
speech claims. 
In its initial opinion, the court declined to apply the Tinker stand-
ards, even though the student’s speech did not deal with satisfactory 
completion of course requirements, and at least some of the speech 
referenced by the court clearly took place outside of a class environ-
ment.106  According to the opinion, the Tinker standards only should 
apply to politically based speech.107  In contrast, stated the court, the 
nursing student’s speech was non-political in nature and dealt only 
with complaints aimed at the school’s internal grading and discipli-
nary policies.108 
As such, determined the court in its first opinion, the Hazelwood 
standards governed the student’s speech claims rather than those 
from Tinker.109  In making the distinction between student speech that 
reflected a political versus non-political message, the court acknowl-
edged that the case did not involve school-sponsored speech.110  But, 
looking heavily to Brown v. Li, the court stated that Hazelwood “has 
been adopted by other courts faced with the question of what protec-
tions are due student expression that touches upon internal school 
matters of pedagogical and curricular concern.”111  That is, the court 
appeared to suggest that even in relation to any of the student’s 
speech taking place outside of an instructional context, the Hazelwood 
standards should apply merely because the content of the speech ad-
 
104 757 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (M.D. Ala. 2010).  The student moved to alter or amend the judg-
ment, which was denied by a later court.  Heenan v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320 
(M.D. Ala. 2011). 
105 Heenan, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. 
106 Id. at 1236–38. 
107 Id. at 1237. 
108 The court looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 
(2007), to support the position that the nature of the speech at issue in Tinker raised spe-
cial First Amendment concerns. 
109 Heenan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 1237–38. 
110 Id. at 1237. 
111 Id. at 1238. 
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dressed pedagogical and curricular issues related to the nursing pro-
gram.112 
In a second opinion,113 while refusing to rescind the grant of 
summary judgment against the student, the court offered some im-
portant clarifications.  The court emphasized that the student’s dis-
missal was proper because it was based on documented poor academ-
ic performance.114  The amended opinion also stated that Hazelwood 
did not sanction institutional authority to take punitive action against 
a student for out-of-class speech that was not made to instructors.115  
The court discussed how Hazelwood could extend to comments made 
concerning the nursing standards “expressed in nurse-training relat-
ed circumstances” as well as perhaps made to instructors outside of 
an instructional setting.116  Notably, even in its revised opinion, the 
court indicated that the Hazelwood standards could still apply to a stu-
dent’s independent, in-class speech critical of instructional methods 
or assessment criteria simply based on the fact that it took place in 
class.117  In doing so, the opinion failed to offer any meaningful dis-
tinctions regarding when a student should be able to, for instance, 
disagree with grading or pedagogical practices, including during 
class, without foregoing First Amendment protection. 
The Heenan decision reveals a court struggling with the extent to 
which the Hazelwood standards should apply to college students’ in-
dependent speech, either taking place in an instructional setting or 
occurring outside of an instructional context, but potentially impli-
cating curricular matters.  In attempting to remove some of the stu-
dent’s speech from the purview of Tinker, the court failed to an-
nounce a very convincing legal rationale as to why the decision only 
applied to independent student speech of a political nature.118  The 
amended opinion in Heenan, despite offering some clarification, also 
 
112 The court found that the college did not violate Heenan’s First Amendment rights as the 
complaints did not rise to the level of protected speech.  The court rationalized that in 
“fulfillment of their duties as educators, the defendants [were] tasked with inculcating 
the necessary knowledge, values, and experience, so that their nursing students can be-
come valued and reliable members of the medical community upon graduation.”  Id. at 
1239.  While the decision thus drew on concepts from cases articulating deferential 
treatment to colleges and their faculties when evaluating academic performance, the 
court relied on Hazelwood as the legal standard to determine that the nursing program’s 
point system  was “clearly ‘reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”  Id. 
113 Heenan v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (M.D. Ala. 2011). 
114 Id. at 1320–21. 
115 Id. at 1321. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Heenan v. Rhodes, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1236–38 (M.D. Ala. 2010). 
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failed to articulate a sound basis for when independent student 
speech having some potential curricular connection should be sub-
ject to faculty authority.119  In sum, the case illustrates problems with 
wholesale importation of the Hazelwood standards to college students’ 
speech, especially when the speech at issue clearly falls outside the 
conceptual umbrella of being school-sponsored in nature.120 
Hazelwood appears to provide a reasonable legal framework ap-
propriate for higher education when dealing most directly with stu-
dent speech pursuant to fulfilling curricular requirements, such as in 
Axson-Flynn.121  In such instances, institutional authority over the stu-
dent’s speech is grounded in faculty expertise to make curricular and 
pedagogical choices clearly tied to student performance and to the 
overall learning environment for other students.  A case like Heenan, 
in contrast, shows the Hazelwood school-sponsored speech concept be-
ing stretched too thin.  Similarly, issues confronted in several of the 
online speech cases, discussed in the next Part, have also revealed the 
need to move away from or modify the Hazelwood standards in rela-
tion to independent student speech occurring in an instructional 
context or raising curricular concerns. 
C.  Student Independent and Curricular Speech Distinctions 
The line of cases analyzed between Subparts A and B raises three 
significant points in the application of student speech outside and in-
side of instructional contexts. 
First, these cases illustrate that the reasonableness standard oper-
ates based on different assumptions.  Student speech outside of an 
instructional setting is afforded greater degrees of freedom with rea-
sonableness interpreted more narrowly, whereas courts have viewed 
reasonableness more broadly in regards to student speech within the 
curricular learning space.  The Heenan case illustrates such a defini-
tional stretch of the reasonable application in curricular matters, one 
well beyond the seeming confines of Hazelwood. 
Second, these cases illustrate that the Supreme Court has estab-
lished quite clearly that forum is not a location-based criterion. The 
Court has taken the forum analysis to include spatial forums in terms 
 
119 See id. at 1236–38; Heenan, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1320–21. 
120 The conflicts regarding the applicable standards present quite evidently the arguments 
pertaining to the over-reliance on K–12 cases—particularly Hazelwood, Tinker, and the cas-
es addressing faculty authority over curricular matters, such as Horowitz and Ewing.  See 
discussions supra Parts I.A and I.C. 
121 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1287 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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of access to what Professor Zick would characterize as an “expressive 
topography.”122  Thus, physical location need not serve as such a strict 
marker to address what falls within the collegiate learning space.  Be-
cause online speech adds new spatial challenges, the notion of cur-
ricular learning space may require re-conceptualization of location in 
terms of where the speech was initiated (i.e., origination of the post-
ing), mediated (i.e., the facilitated transmission), and touched (i.e., 
the impacted campus area). 
Third, student speech cases—e.g., Widmar, Rosenberger, Southworth, 
and CLS—establish that public higher education institutions must not 
favor or discriminate against particular student views in the regula-
tion of forums that are open to students.  This analysis is more restric-
tive regarding viewpoint neutrality than when courts typically employ 
the Hazelwood framework.123  That is, viewpoint neutrality for students’ 
independent speech under the limited public forum standards followed 
in Widmar, Rosenberger, Southworth, and CLS examine if a public col-
lege’s actions foreclose access, while viewpoint neutrality in relation 
to students’ curricular-based speech grants public colleges the authori-
ty to foreclose access in a uniformly viewpoint neutral manner. 
III.  STUDENT ONLINE SPEECH CASES IN AN INSTRUCTIONAL SETTING 
OR WITH A CURRICULAR CONNECTION 
A review of legal decisions involving online student speech shows 
that courts have tended to follow the general distinctions discussed in 
Part II between speech taking place in curricular contexts versus in 
non-curricular settings.  At the same time, the cases demonstrate that 
no definitive framework reflects the appropriate legal analysis for in-
dependent student speech taking place outside of an instructional 
setting but involving some type of curricular connection, such as the 
enforcement of professionalism standards.124  A review of these cases 
 
122 See Zick, Space, Place, and Speech, supra note 37, at 125.  Thus, the cases are consistent with 
the view that greater distinctions are needed and that the expressive topography presents 
a viable analysis to delineate the “space” among these different speech settings. 
123 Even within these cases, there is a slight distinction.  When a case involves the exclusion 
of certain classes of speakers or topics from the limited public forum, the restriction must 
be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.  By contrast, if the regulation excluded certain clas-
ses of speakers or expressive matters of individuals or groups who achieved access to the 
limited public forum, the analysis would have followed a strict scrutiny review.  That is, 
the restriction must be content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ernment interest.  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez (CLS),  130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985–86 
(2010). 
124 See, e.g., Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 2012 WL 1078819, No. 3:09-CV-0025, at *7 (W.D. Ky. 
Mar. 30, 2012) (finding that the nursing program had a legitimate pedagogical purpose 
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serves to magnify the shortcomings of over-reliance on legal stand-
ards derived from cases at the elementary and secondary level to 
higher education student speech claims.  Additionally, several deci-
sions involving independent student speech claims in the context of 
practicums or internships show courts turning to the public employee 
speech cases in defining student speech rights.125  Just as over-reliance 
on legal decisions involving elementary and secondary students is 
misplaced in defining student speech rights in a higher education 
setting,126 looking to the public employee speech standards also often 
strikes a poor legal balance between college students’ speech rights 
and faculty authority. 
A.  Online Speech Cases in an Instructional Setting 
Several online speech cases have dealt with class-related expres-
sion of college students, where courts followed the pattern estab-
lished in previous decisions involving physical classrooms of defer-
ence to academic authority and reliance on the Hazelwood standards.  
One such case, Harrell v. Southern Oregon University,127 dealt with a stu-
dent, Peter Harrell, challenging action taken against him for online 
postings made in two classes taught online.128  The federal district 
court, adopting the report and recommendations of a magistrate 
judge, held that the institution acted appropriately in sanctioning the 
student.129  University officials disciplined Harrell for making online 
postings in two courses that were determined to be disrespectful to 
students and to instructors.130  The student’s postings in the first class 
resulted in a formal censure, and his problematic online postings in 
the second course resulted in probation.131  Illustrative of the type of 
comments made, in one class posting Harrell stated to another stu-
dent that “‘clearly you haven’t bothered to read the rest of the board 
 
to hold a student responsible for posting on a social media site about a patient’s birthing 
process); Byrnes v. Johnson Cnty. Cmty. Coll., No. 10-2690-EFM-DJW, 2011 WL 166715, at 
*2 (D. Kan. 2011) (using none of the traditional frameworks in student speech cases to 
resolve this case, but recognizing less deference to the college for the discipline of nurs-
ing students for having posted photos examining a placenta specimen); Tatro v. Univ. of 
Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 524 (Minn. 2012) (finding that the violation of academic pro-
gram rules was sufficient to discipline a student). 
125 See, e.g., Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007); Snyder v. Millersville, No. 
07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
126 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
127 Harrell v. S. Or. Univ., No. 08-3037-CL, 2009 WL 3562732 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2009). 
128 Id. at *2–3. 
129 Id. at *2. 
130 Id. at *2–3. 
131 Id. at *3. 
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[postings] on this topic.’”132  For this and other instances of speech 
deemed disrespectful to other students, Harrell was disciplined under 
the university’s student conduct standards, which contained a provi-
sion that prohibited students from disrupting, obstructing, or inter-
fering with “‘educational activities.’”133 
In reviewing the student’s claims, the magistrate judge’s report 
and recommendations discussed both Tinker and Hazelwood in rela-
tion to student speech rights, with the court noting that the latter de-
cision sanctioned the regulation of student speech considered school-
sponsored.134  Looking to the Hazelwood standards, the court rejected 
Harrell’s argument that the school’s policy failed on vagueness or 
overbreadth grounds and also rejected the student’s challenge to the 
policy as applied to him.135  In making these arguments, Harrell relied 
on previous decisions where courts had struck down general anti-
harassment rules adopted by colleges or universities that had applied 
to speech or activity outside of the classroom.136  The magistrate 
judge, rejecting these efforts, concluded that the school’s policy per-
missibly sought to regulate conduct that interfered with or obstructed 
educational activities, rather than seeking to target students on the 
basis of particular viewpoints.137  In relation to the as applied chal-
lenge, the magistrate report and recommendations stated, 
Plaintiff argues that because his objectionable speech is connected in 
some way, even tangentially, to his personal political convictions, he is 
entitled to express himself in any way he chooses.  It is possible, however, 
for Plaintiff to express his political views without insulting other stu-
dents. . . . His comments did not express his political opinions, as he as-
serts.  The comments belittle other students’ work and their contribution 
to the discussion.138 
While the federal district court acknowledged that the institu-
tion’s policy could have been clearer, it supported the magistrate 
judge’s determination that college officials acted well within their au-
thority to restrict Harrell’s speech.  According to the court, it ap-
peared that he had “behaved in a manner that would be tolerated in 
few classrooms.  Harrell perceives class discussion as a form of ‘com-
bat’ and he conducts himself accordingly.”139  Discussing the special 
 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at *3 n.1. 
134 Id. at *5–6. 
135 Id. at *6–9. 
136 Id. at *8. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at *9. 
139 Id. at *1. 
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institutional prerogatives existing in relation to the class environ-
ment, the federal district court stated 
A classroom is not a public forum where each student has an absolute 
constitutional right to say whatever he pleases, when he pleases, however 
he pleases, for as long and as often as he pleases.  This is not talk radio. 
Most of the precedents Harrell cites involve speech occurring on campus 
or otherwise having some connection to a school, but not during actual 
classes.140 
Another case, Feine v. Parkland College141 resulted in a similar out-
come to Harrell, with the court in fact looking to that decision for 
support.142  The case dealt with a student, Feine, who made several 
online comments that a course instructor determined to be inappro-
priate and warned the student to modify his future online postings 
directed at other students enrolled in the course.143  The instructor’s 
syllabus contained language that warned students against making 
“‘inappropriate postings (for example: personal attacks, prejudiced 
language, incoherent ramblings, proselytizing, etc.).’”144  In addition 
to warnings from the instructor, a student who was the target of some 
of Feine’s online comments initiated a harassment complaint against 
him that alleged gender and disability discrimination.145  Based on 
Feine’s online posts, the professor deducted points from an assign-
ment and also warned him that future incidents would result in disci-
plinary actions.146  Feine initiated legal action after he unsuccessfully 
lodged an administrative complaint against the instructor, claiming 
deprivation of his First Amendment speech rights.147 
In considering the student’s claims, as in Harrell, the court deter-
mined that the institution did not discipline the student for the con-
tent of his speech but, rather, for the student’s “manner of writing 
and his personal attacks on the postings of another student.”148  While 
pointing out that views and content are generally protected by the 
First Amendment, the court emphasized that the actions taken 
against Feine were based on legitimate pedagogical concerns related 
to his “manner of expression and not the content of his messages or his 
 
140 Id. 
141 Feine v. Parkland Coll. Bd. of Trs., No. 09-2246, 2010 WL 1524201 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 
2010). 
142 Id. at *6.  The opinion does not provide specific details or examples regarding the nature 
of the student’s online comments. 
143 Id. at *1–2. 
144 Id. at *1. 
145 Id. at *3. 
146 Id. at *2. 
147 Id. at *3. 
148 Id. at *6. 
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viewpoints regarding the subject matter of the course assignment.”149  
As such, stated the court, the student could not rely on the First 
Amendment to protect his abusive treatment of other students.150  
The court, directly addressing the online nature of the speech at is-
sue, stated that precedent in the Seventh Circuit had established that 
classrooms are not public forums.151  According to the opinion, 
“[u]nder the circumstances alleged here, the fact that classroom dis-
cussion was conducted via an electronic discussion board and email 
messages does not change the essential nonpublic nature of the class-
room.”152 
Cases such as Harrell and Feine indicate that courts are likely to 
show little hesitation in extending faculty authority recognized over 
student speech taking place in a physical classroom to the context of 
online course environments.  Just as with a physical classroom, courts 
are likely to give considerable latitude to institutions in imposing 
viewpoint neutral regulations to online settings when that speech im-
pinges on the learning environment of other students.  As the next 
Subpart shows, more difficult legal questions have arisen in relation 
to online student speech not arising directly in a class context, but 
still potentially implicating a sufficient curricular or instructional 
concern to permit regulation of the student’s speech on academic 
grounds. 
B.  Cases Outside of an Instructional Setting but Implicating Curricular 
Concerns 
In several cases, courts have considered institutional authority 
over student online speech occurring outside of a formal instruction-
al context but raising curricular concerns, such as the application of 
professionalism standards in internships and practicums.  One of  




151 Id. (citing Linnemeir v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ., 260 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2001)).  
The opinion also discussed Pichelmann v. Madsen, 31 F. App’x 322, 327 (7th Cir. 2002), 
where the court determined that a university e-mail system did not constitute an open fo-
rum. 
152 Feine, 2010 WL 1524201, at *7. 
153 Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:09-CV-205-S, 2009 WL 2406235 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 3, 2009).  
On remand, the district court declined to rule that Yoder’s action was moot because she 
had graduated from the university’s nursing program during the litigation.  Yoder v. 
Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:09CV–205–S, 2011 WL 5434279 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 2011).  Thus, 
this case may still result in a review of Yoder’s claims on First Amendment and due pro-
cess grounds. 
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Yoder, who was dismissed from a nursing program at a public univer-
sity based on online postings appearing on her personal page on the 
social networking site Myspace.154  Yoder made online comments 
about an obstetric patient that she observed during the birthing pro-
cess as part of fulfilling the requirements of a child-birthing class.155  
She wrote, for instance, “‘Beautiful pregnant women are beautiful, or 
more like, only slightly distorted with the belly . . . . Otherwise, preg-
nancy makes an ok-looking woman ugly, and an ugly woman— fuck-
ing horrifying.’”156  Another comment stated, “At last my girl gave one 
big push, and immediately out came a wrinkly bluish creature, all Pi-
casso-like and weird, ugly as hell, covered in god knows what, screech-
ing and waving its tentacles in the air.”157 
After the course’s instructor learned of the posting from another 
student, she determined that Yoder had violated the school of nurs-
ing’s honor code, the course’s confidentiality agreement, the terms 
of the consent form signed by the mother, and the general standards 
of the nursing profession.158  The honor code provided, in part, that 
students agreed “to adhere to the highest standards of honesty, integ-
rity, accountability, confidentiality, and professionalism, in all written 
work, spoken words, actions and interactions with patients, families, 
peers and faculty.”159  The confidentiality agreement provided that 
students would “consider confidential any and all information en-
trusted” to them during clinical rotations, with such information en-
compassing “medical, financial, personal, and employment related 
information.”160  Yoder also agreed to respect the terms of the consent 
form signed by the patient, which stipulated that “[a]ny information 
shared with the named nursing student will be used only for writ-
ten/oral assignments. . . . I understand that information regarding 
my pregnancy and my health care will be presented in written or oral 
form to the student’s instructor only.”161 
The instructor brought the blog comments to the attention of 
administrators, and Yoder was dismissed from the nursing program 
after she admitted to making the blog post.162  Yoder challenged her 
 
154 Yoder, 2009 WL 2406235, at *1. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. (noting that the postings did not offer identifying information regarding the women 
observed by the student). 
157 Id. at *2. 
158 Id. at *3.  
159 Id. 
160 Id.  Yoder also agreed to respect the terms of the consent form signed by the patient. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at *4. 
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dismissal on First Amendment and due process grounds.163  The dis-
trict court initially ruled in Yoder’s favor, but on contractual grounds 
instead of on the basis of the First Amendment.164  Following remand 
from the court of appeals on the basis that the contractual issue had 
not been properly raised for consideration, the federal district court 
upheld the nursing school’s actions.165  The court determined that 
requiring Yoder to adhere to the terms of the confidentiality agree-
ment served a legitimate pedagogical purpose.166  According to the 
court, 
[I]n exchange for the opportunity to follow the birth mother, Yoder 
agreed not to publicly disclose any information about the birth-mother’s 
pregnancy or health care.  And . . . [the school of nursing] had a legiti-
mate pedagogical purpose in requiring that its students agree to that 
condition with the patients they were to follow.167 
Yoder also attempted to argue that other students had not been dis-
ciplined in a similar fashion for their “coarse” or “unprofessional” 
online speech.168  The court accepted the explanation of program of-
ficials that these students had not been subject to discipline because 
their comments did not refer to specific patients.169  In its decision, 
the court discussed that deference to academic judgment is “particu-
larly acute in the case of schools in the health care field.”170  The 
court also held that the dismissal of Yoder complied with due process 
requirements, determining that she was dismissed for academic rea-
sons versus disciplinary ones.171  As such, stated the court, the “fairly 
minimal” process provided to Yoder was adequate.172 
While vacated for improperly considering the student’s claims on 
contractual grounds,173 the initial district court opinion in Yoder pre-
 
163 Id. at *1, *4. 
164 Id. at *5. 
165 Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 417 F. App’x. 529, 529 (6th Cir. 2011) (vacating a previous 
order granting Yoder’s motion for summary judgment); Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 
3:09-CV-0025, 2012 WL 1078819 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2012) (denying Yoder’s motion for 
summary judgment).  In the most recent turn in this litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit held that university officials named in the lawsuit were entitled to 
qualified immunity from liability, as any First Amendment right asserted by Yoder in rela-
tion to her blog posts was not clearly established.  Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 12-
5354, 2013 WL 1976515, at *6–8 (6th Cir. May 15, 2013). 
166 Yoder, 2012 WL 1078819, at *6–7. 
167 Id. at *8 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at *7–8. 
170 Id. at *7. 
171 Id. at *10. 
172 Id. at *9. 
173 Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 417 F. App’x 529, 530 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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sents an interesting contrast with the district court’s later opinion, 
highlighting the inconsistencies that often surround the student 
speech cases.  Namely, in the initial opinion, the district court gave 
much less deference to the academic authority of the nursing pro-
gram faculty regarding the interpretation of the professionalism 
standards at issue.  The court stated in the first opinion that the ap-
plicable standards governing the student’s conduct and speech activi-
ties referred to the disclosure of identifying information and not to 
the disclosure of details involving specific, but unidentified (i.e., 
anonymous) patients.174 
The court in this initial opinion also stated that professionalism 
was not adequately defined in the nursing school’s rules and regula-
tions.175  The university argued that beyond any confidentiality issues, 
the posting violated professionalism standards because of its “vulgar 
and unprofessional manner.”176  The court drew a distinction between 
communications in the context of Yoder carrying out her responsibil-
ities as a nursing student versus her engaging in expression outside of 
a professional context: 
The court does not disagree with Defendants that the Blog Post is vulgar.  
It is generally distasteful and, in parts, objectively offensive.  However, the 
Blog Post is not “unprofessional.”  Rather, it is entirely nonprofessional, 
and therefore it falls outside the purview of the Honor Code.  Yoder did 
not post the Blog “as a representative of the School of Nursing.”  Moreo-
ver, the Blog Post is not “written work, spoken words, actions [or] inter-
actions with patients, families, peers [or] faculty.”  It is simply a crude at-
tempt by Yoder to be humorous in describing an anonymous prolonged 
labor and delivery.  It was written without any clearly intended audience 
and posted on Yoder’s own personal MySpace page.  That the Blog Post 
was technically accessible to the public does not fundamentally alter the 
nature of the writing.177 
The opinion also stated that if the school of nursing meant to include 
the type of information contained in Yoder’s posting, then it bore a 
responsibility to provide “fair notice” to her by specifying the profes-
sionalism obligations imposed on nursing students.178 
While not basing its decision on First Amendment grounds, the 
court in this first Yoder opinion made an important distinction be-
tween a student speaking in a professional setting—such as a clinical 
 
174 Yoder, 2012 WL 1078819, at *6 (“In sum, the Blog Post does not contain information that 
could possibly lead to the discovery of the birth mother’s identity.”). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at *7. 
178 Id. 
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rotation or formal instructional setting—and a student speaking in a 
non-curricular context. 
The contrasting district court opinions in Yoder demonstrate how 
the emergence of online speech has left courts struggling with the 
appropriate legal standards that should govern student speech and 
expression that take place outside of a formal instructional setting, 
but still potentially manifest some type of appropriate curricular con-
nection for institutions to regulate the speech.  In another case that 
raises such concerns with online speech, Snyder v. Millersville Universi-
ty,179 a federal district court turned to the legal standards governing 
public employee speech rights to determine the extent of a student’s 
speech rights.  Snyder dealt with the removal of a university student 
from her student teaching placement by the cooperating school due, 
in part, to online postings that she made.180  Following her removal 
from the student teaching placement, the university could not award 
Stacey Snyder an education degree with teacher certification based 
on Pennsylvania requirements for the awarding of such degrees.181  
She sued the university, alleging deprivation of her First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights.182 
As part of the preparation for her student teaching experience, 
university officials provided Snyder with a guide informing her that 
she was expected to adhere to the same professionalism standards as 
full-time teachers at the placement school.183  Student teachers were 
warned not to “friend” students or teachers on personal Web pages, 
and were informed of a past instance concerning a student teacher 
who was dismissed from a practicum for such activity.184  Snyder, dis-
regarding these admonishments, discussed her Myspace page with 
students at the placement school on several occasions.185 
In one incident, Snyder confronted a student at her placement 
school who had recognized and communicated with a friend of hers, 
ostensibly as a result of viewing content on Snyder’s Myspace page.186  
She discussed this incident on her Myspace page.187  In this same post-
ing, Snyder appeared to refer to a school official as the reason for not 
 
179 Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
180 Id. *5–8.  The student’s removal from the placement meant that she was unable to obtain 
an education degree with teacher certification. 
181 Yoder, 2012 WL 1078819, at *2, *8. 
182 Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *1. 
183 Id. at *3. 
184 Id. at *4. 
185 Id. at *5. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
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wanting to apply for a permanent position at the placement school.188  
Snyder also had a picture on her Myspace page that showed her wear-
ing a pirate hat and holding a plastic cup with the caption “drunken 
pirate.”189  In part because of the content of her MySpace postings, 
school officials disallowed Snyder from continuing her placement.190 
In analyzing Snyder’s claims, the court stated that a threshold is-
sue involved whether she should be viewed as a student or as an em-
ployee for purposes of her First Amendment arguments.191  Influ-
enced by the fact that the student did not attend any classes at the 
university during the period of the placement and the professional 
nature of student teaching assignments, the court determined that 
Snyder “was more a teacher than a student.”192  This meant, according 
to the court, that the student’s speech claims were subject to evalua-
tion under First Amendment rules governing public employees’ 
speech rights.193  Applying these standards, the court stated that her 
speech would be eligible to receive protection if it had addressed a 
matter of public concern, but stated that “[p]laintiff conceded at tri-
al . . . that her posting raised only personal matters.”194  Accordingly, 
the court rejected Snyder’s arguments that she should be eligible for 
the First Amendment protections that typically attach to student 
speech. 
Another case raising issues similar to those at stake in Yoder and 
Snyder is Tatro v. University of Minnesota.195  As with the two district 
court opinions in Yoder, the different analytical frameworks employed 
by the Minnesota Court of Appeals196 and the Minnesota Supreme 
Court197 illustrate how courts are wrestling with the proper legal 
standards to apply to student online speech.  While the case involved 
online speech raising both curricular concerns and the issue of 
threatening speech, we focus on the curricular aspects at issue in the 
litigation. 
The case involved a mortuary science student, Amanda Tatro, who 
made various postings on her Facebook page, such as assigning a 
 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at *6. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at *14. 
192 Id. at *15. 
193 Id. at *14–15. 
194 Id. at *16. 
195 Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 509 
(Minn. 2012). 
196 Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 811. 
197 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 509. 
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nickname to a cadaver used in classroom assignments.198  She also 
posted, for instance, about wanting to use a mortuary device to stab 
someone in the throat, stating, “Hmm . . . perhaps I will spend the 
evening updating my ‘Death List # 5’ and making friends with the 
crematory guy.  I do know the code . . . .”199  Upon learning about the 
postings, university officials—in addition to asking the police to inves-
tigate200—charged the student with (1) violating the student conduct 
code by engaging in harassing or assaultive conduct and (2) violating 
rules governing student behavior in the mortuary science program.201  
A hearing panel determined that the student had violated student 
conduct rules as well as professionalism standards for mortuary sci-
ence students.202  It imposed sanctions on Tatro that included receiv-
ing a failing grade for the course and a requirement that she enroll 
in a clinical ethics course.203 
In relation to the issue of professionalism standards, the Minneso-
ta Court of Appeals considered several grounds on which the univer-
sity took action against Tatro.  The university concluded that Tatro 
violated rules in the mortuary science student conduct code related 
to “carry[ing] out all aspects of the funeral service in a competent 
and respectful manner” and treating deceased persons with “proper 
care and dignity during the transfer from the place of death and sub-
sequent transportation of the remains.”204  The court agreed with Ta-
tro that these provisions dealt with funeral services and, thus, could 
not be applied to her Facebook postings.205 
The court held that Tatro’s Facebook comments could fall under 
the rule regulating conversational language related to discussion of 
cadaver dissection.206  Tatro also argued that the university improperly 
found that she had “violated rules outlined in her signed anatomy-
bequest-program human-anatomy access-orientation disclosure 
form.”207  She contended that the form did not contain any list of 
rules, but the court stated that the form demonstrated recognition 
from Tatro that she “understood the policies and the overall respon-
sibilities that the privilege of dissecting a human body carries with 
 
198 Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 814. 
199 Id. at 815. 
200 Id. at 814.  The university police determined that no crime had been committed.  Id. 
201 Id. at 814–15. 
202 Id. at 815. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 819. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 818–19. 
207 Id. at 819. 
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it.”208  “From the disclosure form,” discussed the court, “it is evident 
that certain policies and rules regarding treating donors with respect 
and dignity were explained during the orientation.”209  As such, the 
court of appeals determined that it was appropriate for the university 
to reference the form in deciding that Tatro “violated the overall pol-
icy requirement of treating donors with respect and dignity.”210 
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the ruling that the univer-
sity could discipline Tatro on academic grounds, but it was careful to 
articulate limits on the extent of institutional authority in this area.211  
The court determined that neither Tinker/Healy nor Hazelwood pro-
vided the appropriate legal frameworks to evaluate Tatro’s speech 
claims dealing with whether she violated curricular standards.212  In 
considering the academic rationale to discipline Tatro, the court 
considered two justifications advanced by the university:  (1) to edu-
cate students regarding applicable professionalism and ethical stand-
ards; and (2) to help maintain the viability of the anatomy bequest 
program by ensuring the respectful treatment of donated remains.213 
Regarding the issue of academic authority as a basis to sanction 
Tatro, the opinion referenced an amicus brief from the American 
Board of Funeral Service Education.  That brief stated that the pro-
gram standards were consistent with the organization’s accreditation 
standards.214  The court viewed the professional standards as equiva-
lent to academic standards, which is a basis to grant universities def-
erence in decision-making absent arbitrary decision-making.  The 
court concluded that Tatro’s social media posting did indeed violate 
academic program rules pertaining to the treatment of human ca-
davers.215 
In relation to the Tinker/Healy standards, the court rejected Ta-
tro’s arguments that her postings were beyond the purview of the 
university’s academic authority.216  She had urged the court to accept 
the position that “public university students are entitled to the same 
free speech rights as members of the general public with regard to 
Facebook posts.”217  Implicitly, the argument she raised contended 
 
208 Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 523 (Minn. 2012). 
212 Id. at 518–21. 
213 Id. at 521–24. 
214 Id. at 516–17. 
215 Id. at 524. 
216 Id. at 517. 
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that her online postings reflected off-campus and non-curricular mat-
ters.  The court acknowledged “the concerns expressed by Tatro and 
supporting amici that adoption of a broad rule would allow a public 
university to regulate a student’s personal expression at any time, at 
any place, for any claimed curriculum-based reason.”218  Despite these 
concerns, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that both parties 
agreed that a university has authority to regulate speech when such 
speech violates professional conduct standards.  Thus, Tatro’s argu-
ment failed. 
The university asserted the Hazelwood standard as the appropriate 
framework, stating that the policy was reasonably related to a legiti-
mate pedagogical objective.  The court disagreed about this frame-
work too.  In rejecting Hazelwood as providing the appropriate stand-
ard, the court stated that the decision’s standards apply to school-
sponsored speech and “addresses the question whether the First 
Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular 
student speech.”219  The court stated that conceiving of Tatro’s Face-
book posts as somehow school-sponsored would provide colleges with 
“wide-ranging authority to constrain offensive or controversial Inter-
net activity by requiring only that a school’s actions be ‘reasonably re-
lated’ to ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”220  It noted that high 
school decisions had interpreted the concept of legitimate pedagogi-
cal concern broadly, permitting schools to address concerns related 
to such issues as courtesy and respect for authority.221 
The court also declined to apply the substantial disruption stand-
ard from Tinker as an appropriate basis to ground the university’s ac-
ademic authority over curricular issues, even as it noted that this had 
been applied in other decisions dealing with online student speech, 
including several ones involving secondary students.222  As the court 
noted, the Tinker opinion had stated that speech causing substantial 
disruption could be subject to educators’ authority.223  But, in relation 
to the university sanctioning Tatro on academic grounds, the court 
pointed out that the issue was not one of disruption to the campus or 
to the mortuary sciences program.224  Instead, the university took ac-
 
218 Id. at 521. 
219 Id. at 518 (internal quotation omitted). 
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tion against Tatro based on violation of professional norms expected 
of students in the mortuary sciences program.225 
Looking to several recent cases dealing with the enforcement of 
professionalism standards in relation to graduate students in counse-
lor education programs,226 the Minnesota Supreme Court focused on 
the enforcement of legitimately based professionalism standards as 
an appropriate basis for institutional authority to extend to student 
off-campus speech, such as that engaged in by Tatro.  The court stat-
ed, “[W]e hold that a university does not violate the free speech 
rights of a student enrolled in a professional program when the uni-
versity imposes sanctions for Facebook posts that violate academic 
program rules that are narrowly tailored and directly related to estab-
lished professional conduct standards.”227 
In reviewing the standards imposed on Tatro, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court discussed that there existed clearly established profes-
sionalism rules for those in the mortuary sciences dealing with re-
spect for human cadavers.228  The court then agreed that the specific 
rules imposed on Tatro comported with these standards and were 
narrowly tailored.229  In making this determination, the court dis-
cussed the importance of showing appropriate deference to academic 
decisions dealing with curricular issues: 
In this case, the University is not sanctioning Tatro for a private conversa-
tion, but for Facebook posts that could be viewed by thousands of Face-
book users and for sharing the Facebook posts with the news media.  Ac-
cordingly, we conclude that the University’s sanctions were grounded in 
narrowly tailored rules regulating widely disseminated Facebook posts.230 
The court noted that the rules applied to Tatro permitted private 
conversational language about cadavers that was respectful.231 
An interesting dimension to the court’s decision involved the em-
phasis that it placed on the public nature of Tatro’s comments.  
Thus, the court did not address the issue of a Facebook posting not 
available to large number of individuals.  The public/private distinc-
tion appeared to represent a dimension responding to how online 
postings, especially on social media sites, can result in widespread dis-
tribution.  The court failed to outline the parameters of this pub-
lic/private divide.  For instance, the court did not discuss the permis-
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sibility of sanctions if a student sent an e-mail or made a statement, 
and then another person posted these comments on a social media 
site. 
In the evolving area of law related to higher education students’ 
online speech, court decisions demonstrate varying approaches re-
garding the appropriate legal standards to apply.  Some courts have 
sought to stretch the Hazelwood standards to accommodate issues 
raised by independent student speech involving potential curricular 
concerns, even when the speech occurs outside of a formal instruc-
tional context.  As demonstrated in Snyder, for students enrolled in 
practicums and internships, the legal standards derived from the 
public employee speech cases have emerged as another option to de-
fine students’ speech rights, one giving far-reaching authority to insti-
tutional officials over student speech in such settings.  In contrast, 
when faced with circumstances not completely distinct from those at 
issue in Snyder, the two district court opinions in the Yoder case repre-
sent additional legal paths to dealing with independent student 
speech raising curricular concerns.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
decision in Tatro represents yet another approach, one mindful of in-
vesting colleges with too much control over independent student 
speech. 
Wading into this muddled situation, this Article now considers the 
issue of what legal standards courts should adopt when balancing le-
gitimate institutional interests related to academic matters with the 
accompanying need to enforce rules suitable for higher education 
environments rather than ones predominately grounded in concerns 
at the elementary and secondary education levels. 
IV.  CONSTRUCTING THE CURRICULAR NEXUS TEST 
In Part III, the focus was to further delineate the concept of 
speech taking place within or implicating the collegiate learning 
space.  Now, in Part IV, the discussion shifts to presenting the Curric-
ular Nexus Test.  Cases involving higher education students’ online 
speech help reveal the legal overreach that occurs as a result of 
wholesale application to higher education of legal standards devel-
oped in cases dealing with elementary and secondary students.  Fur-
ther, the need exists to refine the legal rules governing independent 
student speech in instructional settings or taking place outside of a 
formal class context but potentially implicating curricular concerns.  
Tackling these issues, Subpart A first considers independent student 
speech taking place in a curricular context and then turns to speech 
taking place outside of a formal instructional environment, but po-
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tentially raising legitimate curricular considerations.  Subpart B ex-
amines independent speech that takes place outside of the formal in-
structional setting but has a capacity to reach curricular concerns. 
A.  Independent Student Speech in an Instructional Setting 
In relation to independent student speech taking place in a for-
mal class context, the legitimate pedagogical standards from Hazel-
wood are not wholly unsuitable to apply to college student speech.232  
The important caveat that courts must recognize with these stand-
ards, however, relates to the need to clarify the concept of legitimate 
curricular or pedagogical interest in a higher education environ-
ment.  While at times giving perfunctory acknowledgement to the 
need to tailor these standards to college student speech,233 courts in 
fact often fail to clarify the specific types of criteria that they should 
take into account regarding the concept of legitimate pedagogical 
concerns justifying speech restrictions on college students.234 
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court put substantial emphasis on the 
fact that school officials had acted to protect younger students from 
exposure to certain views or information for which they might not be 
prepared to engage.235  In contrast, the collegiate experience, rather 
than sheltering students from ideas or views from which they might 
not yet be mature enough to encounter, is focused on challenging 
students intellectually, including in relation to examining their own 
values and beliefs.  Instead of seeking to shelter students from certain 
types of views or beliefs, colleges and universities fulfill a special niche 
in the “marketplace of ideas.”236  Accordingly, the concept of peda-
gogical concern announced in Hazelwood should be adjusted to ac-
count for the Court’s declarations that colleges and universities are 
meant to be places of open inquiry and the exchange of ideas.  In es-
sence, the Hazelwood standards need to grow up if they are to consti-
tute legal rules sensible to apply in higher education.237 
 
232 See discussions supra Parts II.B and III.B. 
233 See discussion supra Part II.B, particularly with regard to the Heenan case. 
234 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
235 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 (1988). 
236 See discussions supra Parts I.C and II.B. 
237 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (articu-
lating that the “quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this day remains a 
vital measure of a school’s influence and attainment” so courts should be weary of admin-
istrative actions of “suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital cen-
ters for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses”); Healy v. James, 
408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (“The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculi-
arly ‘the marketplace of ideas.’”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of 
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The application of tort standards to the collegiate environment 
provides a good example of how courts have readily adopted the view 
that college students should be considered as adults.238  Similarly, as 
discussed in Part I, courts have restricted institutional authority to 
regulate student speech in the co-curricular realm, even for speech 
that is offensive to members of the campus community.  Yet, courts 
have too often balked at the need to acknowledge that higher educa-
tion student speech in instructional settings also needs to be differen-
tiated from elementary or secondary student speech.  The suggestion 
that colleges have authority to restrict speech in a manner that signals 
high degrees of control in the learning process reflects an antithetical 
viewpoint about the individual development and responsibility of 
adulthood.239 
Understandably, some of the resistance by courts to question fac-
ulty authority over independent student speech arising in a curricular 
context stems from the judicial deference to academic decisions es-
tablished in cases such as Ewing240 and Horowitz.241  In fact, some opin-
ions have even indicated that academic freedom concerns potentially 
should permit greater control of college students’ speech in instruc-
tional contexts than of elementary and secondary students’ speech;242 
but these opinions have failed to explain under what conditions spe-
cifically such circumstances arise.243  The issue of faculty authority to 
enforce curricular standards and evaluate student competency at is-
sue in cases such as Ewing and Horowitz should not be haphazardly 
comingled with the standards from Hazelwood.  The fact that inde-
pendent student speech has occurred in an instructional context or 
otherwise touched on curricular or pedagogical issues should not 
subject such college student speech in a perfunctory fashion to un-
 
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (recognizing academic freedom as a First Amendment in-
terest because the “Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure 
to that robust exchange of ideas” that occurs in higher education); Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (valuing the role of colleges 
as an atmosphere of “speculation, experiment and creation,” which is “essential to the 
quality of higher education”). 
238 Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979) (“College students today are no 
longer minors; they are now regarded as adults in almost every phase of community 
life.”). 
239 Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Are College Students Adults?  Their Conceptions of the Transition to Adult-
hood, 1 J. ADULT DEV. 213 (1994) (finding that a majority of college students expressed 
signs of adulthood through recognition of independence and responsibility). 
240 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). 
241 Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
242 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
243 See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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warranted institutional control.  Instead, courts need to discern the 
dimensions of the word “legitimate” when referring to a legitimate 
curricular pedagogical interest.  That interpretation must fit the con-
text of higher education as opposed to what could pass for a legiti-
mate pedagogical or curricular interest in an elementary or second-
ary education context. 
As active participants in the marketplace of ideas, college students 
are not supposed to behave merely as passive recipients of ideas and 
knowledge.244  They may advocate for positions, raise questions, and 
challenge the views and positions of others, including faculty.  While 
compelling grounds exist that a student should not enjoy free rein to 
disrupt a course, to interfere with the learning of other students, or 
to ignore curricular requirements developed pursuant to the exercise 
of faculty expertise,245 the Hazelwood standards should not serve as a 
basis to limit higher education students’ right to participate in the in-
tellectual life of the academy, including in relation to voicing cri-
tiques and concerns about academic offerings.  Accordingly, courts 
should pay attention to ensure that restriction of a student’s inde-
pendent speech in a curricular context is backed by curricular or 
pedagogical reasons suitable for adults. 
Notably, absent creating a disruption or failing to satisfy curricular 
requirements, a student’s disagreement in class with curricular, grad-
ing, or professionalism standards should not suffice to trigger a Ha-
zelwood level of faculty control over the speech or expression.  In Hee-
nan v. Rhoades, discussed in Part II, the court clearly struggled with 
this important limitation on Hazelwood in a higher education setting.  
The court discussed the pedagogical need for students to accept and 
address their own academic shortcomings,246 but it failed to sufficient-
ly explain how mere disagreement with an instructor over the evalua-
tion of a student’s work or with curricular standards should serve as a 
basis to invoke the Hazelwood standards.  Giving such unfettered au-
thority to institutions over student speech conflicts with the concept 
of college students as adult members of an intellectual community 
and also runs contrary to student First Amendment cases in other set-
tings, such as those involving institutionally created forums for stu-
dent speech.247 
 
244 PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 16, 72 (2006) (arguing that education 
should not operate off of a “banking model” in which students learn from deposits of in-
formation without fully questioning and engaging in the lessons). 
245 See generally discussion supra Part I. 
246 Heenan v. Rhodes, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1321 (M.D. Ala. 2011). 
247 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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In considering independent student speech taking place in the 
curricular context of practicums and internships, the Snyder v. Mil-
lersville University decision represents an even more problematic ap-
proach than looking to the Hazelwood standards.248  In Snyder, the 
court relied on the public employee speech standards as a basis to 
deny a student an education degree and accompanying state teaching 
certification.249  Under these standards, a public employee engaging 
in speech pursuant to carrying out official employment duties may 
not look to the First Amendment to protect such speech or expres-
sion.250  Speech not made pursuant to carrying out official employ-
ment duties may be eligible for First Amendment protection if it ad-
dressing a matter of public concern.251 
The public employee standards, developed as a result of the need 
to permit public employers adequate control over the workplace en-
vironment,252 are far removed from the types of considerations at is-
sue in regards to faculty authority over curricular matters.  Thus, in 
Snyder, the court conflated the speech standards applicable to public 
school teachers in regards to their employers with the legal standards 
an academic program should follow in relation to student speech 
rights.253  Adoption of such a position permits institutions a degree of 
control over student speech far removed from that permitted in any 
of the other student speech cases, one not requiring even the estab-
lishment of a minimal curricular or pedagogical reason, even in in-
stances where a student could be denied a degree.  While a college or 
university may not be able to force a placement partner to allow a 
student to continue with an internship or practicum, the institution 
should still have to establish that legitimate curricular grounds exist 
to sanction the student or to disallow the granting of a degree. 
The actions of the court in Snyder represent another variation of 
courts failing to tailor speech standards in a way that is appropriate to 
a higher education environment.254  In this instance, rather than 
treating college students in a manner more appropriate for elemen-
tary or secondary students, the Snyder court adopted a stance that 
confused their status and speech interests with that of full-time public 
employees.  In equating an internship or practicum to the experienc-
 
248 Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
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253 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
254 Hutchens, supra note 76. 
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es of full-time employment, the court gave remarkable legal discre-
tion to an institution not merely to dismiss a student from an em-
ployment situation, but also to deny the individual a degree.  That is, 
failing to consider the unique circumstances at stake in relation to 
the student’s educational pursuits, the court in Snyder articulated a 
position giving institutions almost unbridled control over student 
speech arising as part of fulfilling internship or practicum require-
ments.  A student’s participation in a practicum or internship should 
not serve as a sufficient basis to restrict college students’ curricular 
speech under the First Amendment via the public employee speech 
standards. 
Instead, when evaluating student speech in a formal instructional 
setting, including in a practicum or internship, courts should require 
that institutions demonstrate their curricular or pedagogical ration-
ales in a manner that justifies the regulation in relation to the unique 
characteristics of higher education.  This rule, of course, contains ex-
ceptions such as true threats, defamation, incitement, obscenity, and 
actual disruption to the class environment that interferes with the 
learning of other students or a faculty member’s ability to teach (e.g., 
interrupting the instructor or other students).  Further, speech that 
demonstrates a failure to comply with curricular requirements pre-
sumptively fails to meet protections in the curricular setting.  As a 
general matter, college students’ independent in-class speech should 
merit meaningful First Amendment protection.  Accordingly, courts 
should be careful to ensure that institutions are not seeking to play 
the pedagogical card as a means to sanction student speech that runs 
counter to the views or opinions of faculty or institutional officials. 
B.  Independent Student Speech Outside an Instructional Setting but 
Potentially Implicating Curricular Concerns 
In relation to independent student speech taking place outside a 
formal instructional setting, curricular concerns can and do exist, 
such as the enforcement of professionalism standards, where institu-
tional authority should extend to the speech based on academic 
grounds.  Outside such limited instances, institutions should be pre-
sumptively prohibited from sanctioning independent student speech 
based on academic grounds. 
As the Minnesota Supreme Court articulated in Tatro, neither the 
Tinker/Healy nor Hazelwood standards are often appropriate to apply 
to independent student speech generally taking place outside of a 
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formal course environment but raising curricular concerns, such as 
professionalism standards.255  As the decision pointed out, cases such 
as Tinker (and Morse v. Frederick) discuss standards that deal with the 
disruption of the elementary or secondary school environment.256  
Applying the kind of disruption standard on academic grounds artic-
ulated in those decisions to a college setting makes little sense and 
fails to comport with judicial treatment of higher education student 
speech in other contexts. 
For instance, especially in legal decisions involving student fo-
rums, courts have demonstrated an unwillingness to permit colleges 
to prohibit independent student speech simply on the basis that 
members of the campus community may disagree vehemently with its 
contents or find the speech unsettling or offensive.257  Thus, courts 
have disallowed institutions from banning anti-abortion speakers on 
campus from displaying graphic images258 and barring students from 
wearing empty firearm holsters on campus as a means to promote 
open carry laws.259  As pointed out by the Minnesota Supreme Court 
in Tatro, relying on the Tinker substantial disruption standards to reg-
ulate independent, out-of-class speech based on academic concerns 
represents an ill-advised approach, one threatening to provide insti-
tutional officials with too much discretion to restrict student 
speech.260 
As the Tatro decision also pointed out, Hazelwood provides an in-
appropriate set of legal standards to apply to independent student 
speech arising outside of a formal course setting.  The opinion noted 
correctly that permitting a college or university to regulate such 
speech only on the basis of pedagogical concerns absent a sufficient 
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stance, does not depend upon majoritarian consent.”  Id. 
258 ASU Students for Life v. Crow, No.CV 06-1824-PHX-MHM, 2008 WL 686946 (D. Ariz. 
Mar. 10, 2008), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 357 F. App’x. 156 (9th Cir. 2009); Pro-Life 
Cougars v. Univ. of Hous., 259 F. Supp. 2d 5 (S.D. Tex. 2003), appeal dismissed, 67 F. 
App’x. 251 (5th Cir. 2003). 
259 Smith v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 2d 610 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (finding a policy 
that barred students from wearing empty holsters in the classroom and hallways to be un-
constitutional). 
260 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 519–20. 
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and legitimate curricular rationale results in giving colleges too much 
legal leeway over independent student speech taking place outside of 
an instructional setting.  The Minnesota Supreme Court, while not 
completely defining its standard, demonstrated a sounder approach 
in limiting the regulation of out-of-class, independent student speech 
on legitimate professionalism grounds, with such standards derived 
from accepted professional practices and rules.261 
We argue that regulation of independent student speech outside 
of a class setting should require an appropriate curricular nexus (i.e., an 
underlying logic or rationale fitting for higher education students 
versus elementary or secondary ones) before a school can take action 
against a student on academic grounds.  As in Tatro, legitimate pro-
fessionalism standards could suffice.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit, even though invoking Hazelwood, essentially fol-
lowed this type of standard in a recent decision, Keeton v. Anderson-
Wiley,262 when it permitted a counselor education program to take ac-
tion against a graduate student who expressed an intention, includ-
ing through her out-of-class speech, to violate applicable professional-
ism standards of the counseling profession.263  Even though some of 
the student’s comments occurred outside of class, the court permit-
ted the program to take action, as the student had evinced a clear in-
tent not to uphold standards of the counseling profession in dealing 
with clients.264 
A standard that permits a program to take action on academic 
grounds for out-of-class student speech with an appropriate curricu-
lar nexus, such as legitimate and documented professionalism stand-
ards, provides a way to balance legitimate institutional concerns re-
lated to curricular authority with important interests related to 
safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights.  As an example, a law 
student might sign a pledge not to discuss questions on an exam that 
another class section is scheduled to take at a later date.  If the stu-
dent then goes on Facebook and posts information about the exam 
that runs afoul of the pledge, such as discussing information regard-
ing specific questions, then disciplinary action might well be appro-
priate.  At the same time, and as addressed in Tatro, students should 
not simply be able to “sign away” their constitutional rights.265  Thus, 
if the pledge for the exam had stated that students could not men-
 
261 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
262 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011). 
263 Id. at 876. 
264 Id. at 877. 
265 Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521 n.6. 
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tion the exam at all or be critical of the quality of the exam, and the 
student then wrote about the terrible quality of the questions in a 
general sense without providing any specifics, then the institution 
should face a much more difficult task in trying to establish some 
type of appropriate curricular nexus to take action against the stu-
dent for such speech. 
In looking for support for the appropriate curricular nexus test, 
the cases dealing with showing appropriate judicial deference to aca-
demic decision-making and noting the importance of safeguarding 
academic freedom provide a rationale for institutional authority dis-
tinctive from cases involving elementary and secondary students.  Ra-
ther than suggesting that colleges should possess unfettered discre-
tion, as the Tatro court stated, institutional authority in this area 
should be circumscribed.  The exercise of curricular authority should 
align with the mission and purpose of higher education rather than 
be allowed to rest on some kind of vague invocation of educator au-
thority that is overly reliant on standards appropriate for elementary 
and secondary students.266 
In relation to professionalism standards and the idea of an appro-
priate curricular nexus, this standard could also be applied in rela-
tion to practicums and internships.  In Snyder, much of the student’s 
expression at issue took place outside of the student teaching place-
ment.  Students in practicums and internships should be viewed as 
students for purposes of their relationship with a university in terms 
of their ability to remain enrolled in an academic program.267  While a 
school might not be able to prevent a student from being expelled 
from an internship or placement, an institution should not be able to 
deny a student a degree by latching onto the standards of the public 
employee speech cases, namely Garcetti v. Ceballos.268  Accordingly, a 
 
266 Id. at 518. 
267 Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
268 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006) (“So long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of 
public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their 
employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”).  In Snyder, for instance, the application 
of professionalism standards could well have served as a basis to deny the student an edu-
cation degree.  But what about the student who alleges that she is removed for a student-
teaching practicum for complaining about irregularities in the administration of student 
achievement exams?  Even if a teacher’s speech in such circumstances might fail to gar-
ner First Amendment protection under the Garcetti standards, should a student be denied 
a degree because she was fulfilling the duties of a teacher?  Common sense would seem to 
dictate that this is not a rational reason to deny a degree, and such speech should be eli-
gible for First Amendment protection in relation to the student being able to obtain a 
degree. 
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school should not be able to argue that a student raised only issues of 
private as opposed to public concern as a basis to deny a student First 
Amendment protection for independent student speech made out-
side of a formal instructional setting, but somehow connected to pro-
fessionalism standards involving a practicum or internship.269 
CONCLUSION 
Cases involving college students’ online speech demonstrate the 
limits of applying, to those in higher education, legal standards de-
rived from cases dealing with elementary and secondary students.  In 
addition, an emphasis on physical location to determine college stu-
dents’ speech rights often has run into limitations when courts were 
faced with online space.  This Article suggests a Curricular Nexus 
Test as a means to construct a workable legal framework to address 
college students’ online speech that impacts the curricular environ-
ment.  Specifically, we argue for an emphasis on an appropriate cur-
ricular nexus that corrects over-reliance by courts on the K–12 stu-
dent speech cases in constructing First Amendment standards 
applicable to college students.  Reliance on an appropriate curricular 
nexus standard permits institutional regulation of independent stu-
dent speech occurring not only in formal instructional contexts, but 
also outside of formal instructional settings in limited circumstances, 
such as when legitimate and established professionalism standards 
are at stake.  As with our criticism of over-reliance on legal standards 
more appropriate for K–12 students, we also argue against applying 
legal standards from the public employee speech cases to students 
enrolled in practicums and internships. 
The Curricular Nexus Test indicates that independent student 
speech taking place in a formal class context operates by default with 
the legitimate pedagogical standards from Hazelwood.  As such, our 
test is more evolutionary than revolutionary for student online speech 
taking place in a class or instructional setting.  Yet, to create a func-
tional analysis of what constitutes curricular speech, the Curricular 
Nexus Test elaborates on the dimensions to clarify the concept of le-
gitimate pedagogical interest in regards to higher education envi-
ronments.  Specifically, the determination of a legitimate pedagogical 
or curricular interest should be adjusted to account for the Court’s 
declarations that colleges and universities are meant to be places of 
open inquiry and the exchange of ideas.  Thus, an appropriate cur-
 
269 Id. at 414–16. 
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ricular nexus is viewed in terms of (a) students as adults, which in-
cludes the maturity of the students relative to other educational set-
tings (e.g., middle and high school); (b) the educational setting, such as 
classrooms (in-person or online), practicums, and internships; (c) the 
educational environment, which fosters an exchange of ideas (i.e., not a 
banking model consisting of deposited information); and, (d) the de-
gree of intentionality as a careful and deliberate process involving sound 
professional judgment—not perfunctory explanations or stretched 
conceptions of the educational purpose. 
Under the Curricular Nexus Test, a college student’s online 
speech that demonstrates a failure to comply with curricular re-
quirements presumptively fails to meet protections in the curricular 
setting.  Further, this test recognizes already-established exceptions to 
the boundaries of student speech rights such as true threats, defama-
tion, incitement, obscenity, and actual disruption to the class envi-
ronment that interferes with the learning of other students or a facul-
ty member’s ability to teach.  Finally, the Curricular Nexus Test 
indicates that student speech outside of limited, defined instances is 
presumptively prohibited from campus sanctioning of independent 
student speech found within or implicating the curricular learning 
space. 
In sum, in certain circumstances, extending institutional academic 
authority to independent student speech occurring in or out of a 
formal learning space is warranted, such as the enforcement of ac-
cepted professionalism or ethical rules.  But, when independent stu-
dent speech fails to trigger actual curricular or pedagogical concerns 
appropriate for a higher education environment, courts should oper-
ate with a presumption that institutions be prohibited on purely aca-
demic grounds from sanctioning such independent student speech. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
